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LEARNING AND THE LAW: IMPROVING BEHAVIORAL
REGULATION FROM AN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Georgios Dimitropoulos, Philipp Hacker*
Various disciplines are increasingly discovering the power of
learning. However, the potential and the complexities of learning
theory in decision-making contexts have so far been neglected by
scholarship in law and economics as well as behavioral law and
economics: either learning is uncritically assumed to occur and to
mitigate biases, or it is generally claimed that learning is
insufficient to overcome cognitive biases. Even where learning is
considered, the scope is merely limited to individual or social
learning. Learning by and across institutions, a crucial factor for
effective regulation, is largely ignored. That type of learning
should be paramount, however, as an increasing number of
institutions at the international and domestic level are adopting
behavioral regulation, which prides itself on facilitating “smart
decisions.”
This Article argues that legal analysis should tap the precious
resource of learning to facilitate lasting and beneficial real-world
effects. It draws on social and cognitive psychology, behavioral
game theory, and organizational science to show that there are
vast effectiveness and efficiency gains to be made from an
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from comments by David Singh Grewal, Sabrina Artinger, Michael Riegner and
Anne-Lise Sibony, as well as the audiences at the “Future of Regulation”
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integration of learning theory into regulatory and private law
contexts. Interdisciplinary learning theory suggests that such gains
can be made through learning by doing, observational learning, as
well as recursive and generative learning. These learning methods
can be used at the individual, social, team, and institutional level,
which is demonstrated using case studies from international law,
as well as American and European Union law. As an overarching
category subsuming these forms of learning, the Article develops
the concept of systemic learning. It suggests that the law should
introduce systemic learning patterns in public and private law
contexts through feedback loops and institutionalized systemic
learning facilities. Finally, it proposes the institutionalization of an
Agency for Systemic Learning Management. Having ignored
learning theory in the past, future behavioral regulation should put
learning efforts center stage as it unfolds on a global scale.
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INTRODUCTION
Various fields of science, such as game theory, welfare
economics, and management theory, are increasingly discovering
the power of learning.1 This Article argues that legal analysis
1 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ&BRUCEC. GREENWALD, CREATING A LEARNING
SOCIETY: A NEW APPROACH TO GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL
PROGRESS 170 (2014). See, e.g., DAVID BOUD ET AL., PEER LEARNING IN
HIGHER EDUCATION: LEARNING FROM AND WITH EACH OTHER 85–88 (David
Boud et al. eds., 2014) (describing and providing examples of the management
discipline of learning); JOHNHATTIE, VISIBLE LEARNING: A SYNTHESIS OFOVER
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should tap this resource as well. We draw on social and cognitive
psychology, behavioral game theory, and organizational science to
show that vast gains in effectiveness and efficiency could be
derived from an integration of scientific learning theory into
regulatory and private law contexts.2 We critically revisit past and
800 META-ANALYSES RELATING TO ACHIEVEMENT 2–3 (Routledge ed., 2009)
(noting the importance of different learning strategies, particularly feedback);
GREGORY L. MURPHY, THE BIG BOOK OF CONCEPTS 115–40 (2002) (describing
category learning); PETER SENGE ET AL., THE DANCE OF CHANGE: THE
CHALLENGES TO SUSTAINING MOMENTUM IN LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS 301
(2014) (advocating for the management theory of learning) [hereinafter PETER
SENGE ET AL., THE DANCE OF CHANGE]; ELSEVIER SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL
ASPECTS OF LEARNING 251 (Sanna Järvelä ed., 2011) (providing further
guidance on the management discipline of learning); Thorsten Chmura et al.,
Learning in Experimental 2×2 Games, 76 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 44, 44-45,
59-60 (2012) (describing and advocating for game theory discipline); Ido Erev
& Ernan Haruvy, Learning and the Economics of Small Decisions, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth
eds., 2d ed. forthcoming) (providing information on the general economic
theory); LUCAS, GALEM. ET AL., AGAINST GAME THEORY 16, 19 (2015) (“[T]he
cognitive study of decision-making must include the study of learning within
institutions.”); Laurent Lehmann et al., Does Evolution Lead to Maximizing
Behavior?, 69 EVOLUTION 1, 28 (2015) (advocating for game theory discipline
and providing specific examples of strategies); Emre Soyer & Robin M.
Hogarth, Learning from Experience in Nonlinear Environments: Evidence from
a Competition Scenario, 81 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 48, 49 (2015) (describing
hurdles to successful learning from experience, and ways to overcome them
through feedback); Robert J. Jackson et al., How Quickly Do Markets Learn?
Private Information Dissemination in a Natural Experiment 3–4 (Colum. Bus.
Sch. Res. Paper No. 15-6) (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2544128 (discussing
the speed of the impounding of private information in stock prices as a case of
“learning”).
2 For an overview of the different disciplines, see John DeLamater &
Amanda Ward, Preface, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY v–vi (John
DeLamater & Amanda Ward eds., 2d ed. 2013) (noting that social psychology
studies the interaction between the individual and collective entities, and
investigates the causes of human social behavior); Nick Braisby & Angus
Gellatly, Foundations of Cognitive Psychology, in COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 1, 2
(Nick Braisby & Angus Gellatly eds., 2d ed. 2012) (“[C]ognitive psychology is
the branch of psychology devoted to the scientific study of the mind.”); COLIN F.
CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY 4 (2003) (explaining that behavioral
game theory uses experiments to investigate in how far people’s real actions
match the mathematical predictions of traditional game theory); RICHARD M.
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present experience with the use of behavioral regulation at the
international level and, comparatively, in the United States and the
European Union, and develop a comprehensive framework for
implementing learning theory at the core of future behavioral
regulation.
Scholarship in Law and Economics as well as behavioral law
and economics3 has largely neglected the potential and the
complexities of learning theory in decision-making contexts by
disregarding long-run learning effects, i.e., the impermanence of
behavioral interventions over time; by uncritically assuming that
learning occurs; or by generally claiming that learning is
CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 225 (2d. ed.,
1992) (introducing core features of decision making within organizations as a
branch of organizational science); Nakiye Avdan Boyacigiller & Nancy J. Adler,
The Parochial Dinosaur: Organizational Science in a Global Context, 16 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 262, 277 (1991) (noting that organizational science deals with
managerial behavior and its impact on organizations). See generally Christoph
Engel, Learning the Law, 4 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 275 (2008) (discussing how
individuals learn the law and how the law can introduce learning patterns in
public and private law contexts).
3 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (1998) (arguing that law and economics should
take note of findings in the behavioral sciences, particularly in cognitive
psychology); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1053–60 (2000) (noting that rational choice theory does
not adequately capture human behavior and should not undergird legal
reasoning); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 8 (2008) (arguing that
regulatory practice should harness heuristics and biases to advance individual
and social welfare) [hereinafter THALER& SUNSTEIN, NUDGE]; OREN BAR-GILL,
SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER
MARKETS 15 (2012) (showing how contracts are framed to exploit cognitive
biases); NUDGE AND THE LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 1–2 (Alberto
Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony eds., 2015) (suggesting European perspectives
to behavioral law and economics). See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW &
ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (demonstrating a number of heuristics
and biases relevant to legal scholarship); EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON
BEHAVIOURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 3 (Klaus Mathis ed., 2015) (presenting
European perspectives to Behavioral Law and Economics).
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insufficient to overcome cognitive biases.4 This often reflects an
academic bias, which leads scholars to unilaterally draw on often
controversial interdisciplinary theories that support their normative
intuitions.5 Such bias creates fatal path dependencies, which leads
to neglect of fruitful fields of scientific inquiry in legal analysis.6
This narrative may hold true with respect to learning theory as
well. Behavioral law and economics has almost uniquely focused
on cognitive psychology, disregarding not only more heterodox
phenomena within cognitive psychology, but also, crucially, of
4 Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should
not be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91
GEO. L.J. 67, 165–66 (2002); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg,
Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for
Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1039, 1044–45, 1050 (2012). But see Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 615 (2002) (stating that authors
“do not claim that the cognitive model ineluctably generates an exhaustive and
determinative set of specifications for designing perfect regulatory institutions,”
rather, they “suggest that it offers a new set of metaphors for understanding the
vulnerabilities and the capabilities of public policymaking processes.”); Chris
Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 33–43 (2007) (developing similar concepts in the frame of judicial
decision-making). Some public policy oriented scholarship has reflected on this
aspect of behavioral regulation, see Kim Ly & Dilip Soman, Nudging Around
the World, in RESEARCH REPORT SERIES, BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS IN ACTION,
ROTMAN SCH. OF MGMT, UNIV. OF TORONTO 13 (2013) (“It is also
recommended that policymakers measure the effect of the intervention after it is
implemented and adapt policies as needed.”). See also PETE LUNN,
REGULATORY POLICY AND BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS 58 (2014) (referencing
Recommendation 5 of the OECD, RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL ON
REGULATORY POLICY ANDGOVERNANCE 12 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/gover
nance/regulatory-policy/49990817.pdf).
5 For a similar claim, see Kathryn Zeiler, Cautions on the Use of
Economics Experiments in Law, 166 JITE 178, 185–87, 91 (2010).
6 Georgios Dimitropoulos, From Choosing to Learning: Path
Dependencies of Nudging, and How to Overcome Them, in CHOICE
ARCHITECTURE IN DEMOCRACIES: EXPLORING THE LEGITIMACY OF NUDGING
339 (Alexandra Kemmerer et al. eds., 2016) (discussing the path dependencies
of behavioral law and economics on traditional law and economics) [hereinafter
Dimitropoulos, From Choosing to Learning].
480 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
social psychology, behavioral game theory, and organizational
science—disciplines in which learning theory is mostly grounded.7
The addition of learning theory to the interdisciplinary sources
used in legal analysis can be structured along two major
questions.8 First, who should learn? Second, how should these
actors learn? We answer these questions taking an international
and comparative perspective, analyzing case studies from different
fields of regulatory law and critically evaluating various regulatory
strategies in the fields of international development and
international trade law. Furthermore, this Article examines
behavioral regulation from both sides of the Atlantic, such as
President Obama’s Executive Order 13,563 and related documents,
novel initiatives implemented by the European Union, green
nudging approaches, and smart consumer disclosures.9
This Article posits several novel propositions. First, while the
existing legal literature has dealt to some extent with social
learning by individual actors,10 the law must recognize both
individuals and institutions as “learning actors” in an approach we
label “systemic learning.” This includes coordination of learning
efforts between individual actors, private companies, and
regulatory agencies.
Second, this Article posits that in legal contexts, three
institutional structures are crucial to implement learning theory
7 For differences between these disciplines, see discussion supra note 2.
For an overview of learning theory grounded in the mentioned disciplines, see
discussion infra Section I.
8 Cf. Colin J. Bennett & Michael Howlett, The Lessons of Learning:
Reconciling Theories of Policy Learning and Policy Change, 25 POL’Y SCI., 275
(1992) (basing their analysis on the questions “who is learning,” “what is
learned,” and to “what effect”).
9 See Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, Exec. Order No.
13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (highlighting the importance of
“flexible approaches” in regulation that maintain freedom of choice, thereby
introducing nudging into the regulatory portfolio of U.S. agencies).
10 See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Checkel, Why Comply? Social Learning and
European Identity Change, 55 INT’L ORG. 553 (2001) (highlighting the
importance of social learning within international organizations to bring about
normative compliance); Alan Schwartz, Regulating for Rationality, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 1373, 1406–09 (2015) (suggesting that effective disclosure may facilitate
social learning and efficient contracting).
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insights: feedback loops, institutionalized systemic learning
facilities, and a proposed Agency for Systemic Learning
Management (“ASLM”).11 Feedback loops help to integrate
individual and institutional learning into systemic learning. When
regulatory bodies roll out policies designed to help people learn,
such as disclosures or default rules, continuous feedback on their
effectiveness is necessary to stimulate institutional learning within
the regulatory facility. Some regulatory agencies have already used
this strategy in the form of “pretesting,” for example the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau and the British Financial Conduct
Authority.12 However, the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (“OECD”) Indicators of Regulatory
Policy and Governance (“iReg”) show that the number of OECD
member countries who practice ex post evaluation of regulatory
policy is declining.13 Rather than relying only on cost-benefit
analysis and impact assessment, regulatory agencies should
increasingly adopt a feedback loop strategy. This first-order,
feedback-driven learning effect at the institutional level can be
used to improve regulatory strategies which, in turn, enhance
second-order learning effects for the regulation’s intended subjects.
Such a strategy can be designed, monitored, and guided by
institutionalized systemic learning facilities including task forces
within regulatory agencies or private companies. The insights of
interdisciplinary learning theory, such as observational learning,
learning by doing, reinforcement mechanisms, and structured
thinking, should be fully incorporated into the legal design of these
facilities.
11 See infra Section III.B.
12 See infra Sections II.C.2, II.D.2.
13 See Christiane Arndt et al., 2015 Indicators of Regulatory Policy and
Governance: Design, Methodology and Key Results 18 (OECD Regulatory
Policy Working Paper, No. 1, 2015), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5jrnwqm3zp43-en.pdf?expires=1496797061&i
d=id&accname=guest&checksum=87573E1A9B77D163CD78B106F78AC73D;
see also OECD, BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS AND POLICY: LESSONS FROM AROUND
THE WORLD 43 (2017), https://people.kth.se/~gryne/papers/OECD_2017.pdf
(deploring a lack of ex post evaluation of regulatory interventions) [hereinafter
OECD, BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY].
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Finally, to coordinate efforts to implement systemic learning
facilities within both government agencies and private institutions,
this Article recommends the establishment of an ASLM with a
dual role. First, it would advise and control the government
agencies and related institutions regarding the installation of
continuous learning facilities, particularly to encourage the
dissemination of learning across and between institutions. Second,
it would identify best practices for dealing with systemic learning
in private law settings to be distributed among private institutions,
and warn them about dysfunctional practices that have proven
ineffective elsewhere. In doing so, agencies can pay greater
attention to cultural differences which mediate and alter behavioral
effects of regulation. The ASLM could also be institutionally
supported at the international level by a “meta-nudge unit.”14
These institutional features are examples of a novel category of
learning that this Article terms “systemic learning.”15 Systemic
learning stresses the necessary intersection of learning by
institutions and individual actors in market and nonmarket settings
(see Table 1).16 Thus, systemic learning comprises individual,
social, and institutional learning in an attempt to facilitate
generating and retaining knowledge in what Columbia economics
professors Joseph Stiglitz and Bruce Greenwald have recently
called a “learning society.”17
Table 1: 18
14 See infra Section III.B.3.
15 See infra Section III.A.2.
16 See infra Table 1.
17 STIGLITZ&GREENWALD, supra note 1.
18 Table 1 visualizes the relationship between the different types of
learning. Individual learning, the smallest segment, deals with learning
processes within individuals only. Societal learning is the aggregate of
individual learning at a social level, that is, the sum of many individuals’
learning. Moreover, institutions and organizations are entities, distinct from
individuals, that learn as well. Systemic learning encompasses learning at all
these dimensions: individual, societal, institutional and organizational; most
notably, it stresses the interrelations and feedback processes between these
different levels of learning. See infra Section III.A.2.
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This Article’s contribution is threefold. At the methodological
level, it draws on both cognitive and social psychology, as well as
game theory and organizational science, to construct a more
balanced approach in behavioral law and economics.
Substantively, it shows how learning theory can be used to
enhance the effectiveness of regulatory interventions and of private
market actors. Structurally, it makes concrete proposals pertaining
to regulatory agencies and private actors’ organization to better
facilitate gains from learning theory.
This Article is organized as follows: Part I presents the concept
of learning in various disciplines—from economics to
organizational behavior—and distills common prerequisites that
can be used in legal analysis and in the application of learning
theory to regulation. Moreover, it identifies a “black hole”
concerning learning in the literature of traditional and behavioral
law and economics. Part II examines international perspectives on
behavioral regulation and learning, as well as compares and
European legal regimes to highlight the absence of learning
strategies in various regulatory settings. To close the gap of the
484 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
absence of learning in behavioral law and economics, Part III
identifies a coherent legal framework for behavioral regulation
through learning and identifies concrete policy tools for
implementing learning in regulatory contexts.
I. LEARNING IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE LAW
Disciplines other than the law have already recognized the
importance of learning for individuals and institutions.19 We first
consider psychology, which is already much used in
interdisciplinary work in law,20 followed by economics, which is
the social science with the greatest contemporary influence on the
law.21 From these perspectives, we aim to establish a
nonexhaustive, yet comprehensive, picture of contemporary
learning theory.22
A. Psychology
Modern science develops the theory of learning from an
empirical perspective, formulating precise conditions and
19 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Processing Pleadings and the Psychology
of Prejudgments, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 413, 413–14 (2011) (finding that, from a
psychological perspective, judges are unable to implement the requirements of
heightened pleading articulated by the Supreme Court); Yuval Feldman & Orly
Lobel, Behavioural Tradeoffs: Beyond the Land of Nudges Spans the World of
Law and Psychology, in NUDGE AND THE LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 301
(Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony eds., 2015) (arguing that psychology
should be tapped as a resource for the law, but that doing so necessitates a range
of intricate trade-offs between different legal goals); Anne-Lise Sibony, Can EU
Consumer Law Benefit from Behavioural Insights? An Analysis of the Unfair
Practices Directive, 6 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 901, 917–927 (2014) (arguing that
social psychology may help refine the notions of misleading advertisements and
undue influence in unfair competition law).
21 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed.,
2014); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(2004) (both providing ample evidence from scholarship and case law).
22 Learning theory has been used in many more disciplines. See, e.g., Jack
S. Levy, Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield, 48
INT’L ORG. 279, 296–97 (1994) (for an account of learning in international
relations). For further discussion, see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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strategies conducive to learning processes. Psychology is a case in
point. While much of behavioral law and economics has drawn on
cognitive psychology,23 we aim to use insights from both cognitive
and social psychology to build our case.
1. Cognitive Psychology
Learning is not a traditional concept of inquiry in cognitive
psychology. However, important insights can be gained from
cognitive research pertaining to the central element of cognition:
memory. While long-term memory has no significant storage
limits, working memory capacity is clearly limited.24 It can only
process and store a limited amount of information at a time. This is
the structural, cognitive basis for capacity and memory limits.25
Where does this limit lie? Recent studies show that, depending on
the context, the limit may already be reached at four pieces of
information, so-called chunks.26 The highest reported numbers,
stemming from consumer choice tests, are up to fifteen
simultaneously processable chunks.27 In general, seven—the
“magical number” introduced by George Miller’s famous essay28,
23 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychological Foundations of Behavioral Law
and Economics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1675, 1677–78 (2011) (noting that, given
its indebtedness to cognitive psychology, it is a great anomaly that “Behavioral
Law and Economics” is not called “Cognitive Psychology and Law”).
24 For an early account, see James R. Bettman et al., Cognitive
Considerations in Designing Effective Labels for Presenting Risk Information, 5
J. PUB. POL’Y&MARKETING 1, 9 (1986).
25 See Alan Baddeley, Working Memory: Theories, Models, and
Controversies, 63 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 7 (Jan. 2012).
26 See id. at 15; Nelson Cowan, The Magical Number 4 in Short-Term
Memory: A Reconsideration of Mental Storage Capacity, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN
SCI. 87 (2000).
27 Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision Making,
8 J. CONSUMER RES. 419, 427 (1982) (reporting empirical studies that suggest
information overload starts at “ten or more alternatives in the choice set or with
information on 15 or more attributes”).
28 George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some
Limits on Our Capacity For Processing Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81
(1956).
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continues to be a good estimate for the maximum number of
retainable chunks.29
How can complex information consisting of more than four to
fifteen pieces of data be processed and learned at all? The answer
lies in a cognitive, automatic technique called “chunking.”30 The
working memory (sometimes also called short-term memory) is
able to bundle smaller pieces of information into larger chunks.31
For example, the number 1914191819892016 can be broken down
into 1914, 1918, 1989, and 2016. Importantly, information can be
better retained in the memory when it is hierarchically structured.32
Nevertheless, capacity limits remain intact at every hierarchical
level.33 The simultaneous processing of more than four to fifteen
chunks per level leads to a partial breakdown of cognitive
capacities, so-called information overload.34 This phenomenon not
29 Robert S. Owen, Clarifying the Simple Assumption of the Information
Load Paradigm, 19 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 770, 773 (1992) (noting that
evidence supports Miller’s magical number as “a rough benchmark”).
30 See, e.g., TORKEL KLINGBERG, THE OVERFLOWING BRAIN 55–56 (2009)
(describing chunking as the combination of information into small bits). Herbert
Simon, How Big is a Chunk, 183 SCIENCE 482 (1974) (noting that chunks
organize input into familiar units). For an example, see infra Section I.A.1.
31 Nelson Cowan et al., Models of Verbal Working Memory Capacity: What
Does it Take to Make Them Work?, 119 PSYCH. REV. 480, 481 (2012)
(“[S]pecial attention has been paid to the possibility that verbal items can be
combined mentally to form larger chunks of information.”).
32 STEPHEN K. REED, COGNITION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 211–13
(2006); Gordon H. Bower et al., Hierarchical Retrieval Schemes in Recall of
Categorized Word Lists, 8 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 323, 323
(1969).
33 Cowan et al., supra note 31, at 481; Cowan, supra note 26, at 93
(discussing how bundling several chunks into new units gives rise to so-called
compound short-term memory (STM) limits).
34 See Angela Edmunds & Anne Morris, The Problem of Information
Overload in Business Organizations: A Review of Literature, 20 INT’L J. INFO.
MGMT. 17, 18 (2000); Martin J. Eppler & Jeanne Mengis, The Concept of
Information Overload: A Review of Literature from Organization Science,
Accounting, Marketing, MIS, and Related Disciplines, 20 INFO. SOC’Y. 325, 326
(2004); Owen, supra note 29, at 771.
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only causes stress, but also a marked deterioration of decision-
making quality.35
2. Social Psychology
If cognitive psychology focuses on individual actors’ mental
dispositions and structures, social psychology analyzes the effects
of the interactions between multiple individuals on those
individuals.36 In the 1960s, psychologists Albert Bandura and
Richard Walters developed “social learning” or “social cognitive
theory.”37 An important insight of social cognition research is that
learning in social settings often occurs through observation and
imitation,38 even in the absence of reinforcement through
reproduction of the action by the learner.39 Knowledge in this
context is acquired by observing a model, an exemplary person
who performs a certain action in a specific way.40 Importantly,
knowledge can spread within and across groups by such forms of
social learning.41
35 Edmunds & Morris, supra note 34, at 18–19 (discussing how the quality
of decisions declines once a threshold of information input that can be
meaningfully cognitively processed has been reached); Eppler & Mengis, supra
note 34, at 331; see also David Hirshleifer et al., Driven to Distraction:
Extraneous Events and Underreaction to Earning News, 64 J. FIN. 2289, 2290
(2009) (arguing that distraction, provoked by information overload, leads to an
underreaction to important news in securities markets).
36 See sources cited supra note 2.
37 See ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND
ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 1 (1986).
38 See ALBERT BANDURA& RICHARD H. WALTERS, SOCIAL LEARNING AND
PERSONALITYDEVELOPMENT 47, 52 (1963).
39 Joan E. Grusec, Social Learning Theory and Development Psychology:
The Legacies of Robert Sears and Albert Bandura, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 776, 781 (1992).
40 See, e.g., Albert Bandura et al., Observational Learning as a Function of
Symbolization and Incentive Set, 37 CHILD DEV. 499, 500–502 (1966) (showing
how children learn through observation and imitation) [hereinafter Bandura et
al., Observational Learning].
41 See id.
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Observational learning according to Bandura comprises four
necessary requirements.42 First, the model must be attended to;
individuals cannot learn if they do not take note of what the model
does.43 Second, the material needs to be stored in the observer’s
memory, in verbal or imaginal representations.44 Third, there must
be sufficient motivation to perform the observed actions.45 Fourth,
the observer must be able to conduct, that is, to motorically
reproduce, the actions; complex actions, for example, are much
harder to reproduce through observational learning than simple
actions.46
Throughout a day we experience all kinds of situations and
observe a great variety of different behaviors. How do we decide
then which ones to emulate? Reinforcement plays a crucial role
here. We often reproduce actions from which we expect greater
benefits, comfort, or other advantages.47 This is what is known as
anticipatory reinforcement. Reinforcement in social cognitive
theory acts as a motivation device; it is not strictly necessary, but
facilitative and effective.48 Furthermore, reinforcement typically
applies to actions a person has undertaken him or herself or
observed in others.49 These models are typically referred to as
direct and vicarious reinforcement, respectively. Reinforcement
thus functions as a sort of positive feedback loop.
All in all, a number of important insights emerge from this
review of social cognition theory. First, learning is “inextricably
42 ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY 6–8 (1971) [hereinafter
BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY]; Grusec, supra note 39, at 781–82.
Bandura labels these four essential processes as attention, retention,
reproduction, and reinforcement. BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY 6–8
(1971).
43 BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY, supra note 42, at 6–7.
44 Id. at 7.
45 Id. at 8.
46 Id.
47 Bandura et al.,Observational Learning, supra note 40, at 505.
48 Id. at 504–06.
49 Id.
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interwoven” with social relations.50 It often most effectively takes
place within and across groups.51 Second, learning often occurs
through observing models, even in nonconscious ways.52 Third,
since models play such an important role in the adaptive behavior
of humans, legal theories of learning can take advantage of these
insights by ensuring that the models observed are indeed
worthwhile role models.53 Social learning and social cognitive
theory have thus become milestones in developmental psychology.
The validity of its social-based concepts and theories is
underscored by numerous empirical studies.54 These findings
should not be overlooked by the law.
B. Economics
Many social psychology concepts can be found in
contemporary economic models of learning. For years, the
acquisition and processing of new information in economics had
been driven by a distinctly mathematical model: Bayesian
updating.55 This elegant theory posits that prior information is
updated in a mathematically precise way as new information
becomes known to the decision maker.56
Behavioral decision theory has challenged the empirical
accuracy of this view over the past few decades. A host of biases
50 WM. THEODORE DE BARY, THE GREAT CIVILIZED CONVERSATION:
EDUCATION FOR A WORLD COMMUNITY 127 (2013); see sources cited supra
notes 38–40.
51 Bandura et al., Observational Learning, supra note 40 at 500.
52 Id.
53 See id.
54 Grusec, supra note 39, at 783.
55 The theory of Bayesian updating dates back to Thomas Bayes. Bayes &
Price, An Essay towards solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, 53 PHIL.
TRANSACTION ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON 370, 370–418 (1764),
http://rstl.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/53/370.short. For a contemporary
formulation and application, see Thomas L. Griffiths et al., Bayesian Inference,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 22 (Keith K.
Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., 2012).
56 Griffiths et al., supra note 55, at 23.
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such as confirmation bias,57 the base rate fallacy,58 or the
availability heuristic59 indicate that, more often than not, real
decision makers do not follow mathematical principles: they do not
update new information neutrally, but in ways that confirm their
pre-conceived ideas; and they do not account for the statistical
strength of the information, but adjust according to the readiness
with which examples come to mind. Significantly, a recent case
study by professors Lauge Poulsen and Emma Aisbett suggests
that states as entities, mediated by government officials, learn in a
boundedly rational rather than Bayesian way.60
These biases, and behavioral decision theory in general, have
received substantial attention in behavioral law and economics
literature in the last fifteen years.61 However, economic theory has
begun to develop learning theories that are still vastly
underappreciated in the legal landscape. As a genuine economic
concept, learning is studied first and foremost in game theory.62
57 See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175–77 (1998).
58 See Maya Bar-Hillel, The Base-Rate Fallacy in Probability Judgments,
44 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 211, 211–215 (1980). For a critical perspective, see,
Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Descriptive,
Normative, and Methodological Challenges, in 19 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCI. 1
(1996).
59 Baruch Fischhoff et al., Fault Trees: Sensitivity of Estimated Failure
Probabilities to Problem Representation, in 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 330, 332–33 (1978); Korobkin & Ulen,
supra note 3, at 1087–91; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A
Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207,
207–09 (1973); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus
Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90
PSYCHOL. REV. 293, 293–94 (1983).
60 Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, When the Claim Hits:
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning, 65 WORLD
POLITICS 273, 292–94, 297–300 (2013); see also Jack S. Levy, supra note 22, at
279 (presenting empirical evidence on boundedly rational behavior by diplomats
and other agents in foreign policy).
61 See BAR-GILL, supra note 3, at 15; Jolls et al., supra note 3, at 1471;
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 3, at 1053.
62 Cf. DREW FUDENBERG & DAVID K. LEVINE, THE THEORY OF LEARNING
IN GAMES 3 (1998) (arguing that “learning models that have been studied so far
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1. Game Theory
Game theoretic models that capture learning effects will often
explicitly draw on concepts of social psychology and turn them
into mathematical and experimentally testable constructs.63 There
are three main models explaining learning in game theory:64
reinforcement approaches, belief learning models, and experience-
weighted attraction (“EWA”) learning.65 While reinforcement
learning only looks at an individual player’s66 past experiences,
players learn from other players’ alternative strategies in belief
learning.67 EWA learning, a leading theory of learning in
contemporary game theory,68 presents a synthesis of reinforcement
do not do full justice to the ability of people to recognize patterns of behavior by
others.”).
63 Id. at 3–4, 94, 139, 158–60.
64 Further models can be found in the following: Chmura et al., supra note
1 (discussing action-sampling learning and impulse-matching learning);
CAMERER, supra note 2, at 270–71, 288–92, 295–98 (describing also imitation,
learning direction theory and rule learning).
65 CAMERER, supra note 2, at 268–70. For a theoretical treatment of the
connection between rational learning strategies and Nash equilibria, see Ehud
Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium, 61
ECONOMETRICA 1019 (1993).
66 Individual actors are called players in game theory. See FUDENBERG &
LEVINE, supra note 62, at 1.
67 CAMERER, supra note 2, at 268–69. Reinforcement learning describes
strategies in which previously successful choices by the agent “reinforce” these
actions in future decision making situations. Id. at 268. If, for example,
cooperating with B proved beneficial to A at one point, this raises the likelihood
of A choosing cooperation when facing C in a future interaction. Belief learning
models, by contrast, focus on choices by other agents. Id. at 268-269. If A
cooperated successfully with B, but observed that D was even more successful
by defecting vis-à-vis E, then A might choose defection in his future encounter
with C. In one popular variety of belief learning, fictitious play, A keeps track of
how often other players play certain strategies, update their beliefs on what their
counterparty will do accordingly, and choose strategies that are likely to be
successful given these beliefs. Id. at 269. In EWA learning, players can combine
both strategies, using some reinforcement, and some belief learning, at varying
ratios. Id.
68 See, e.g., Chmura et al., supra note 1, at 60 (showing that EWA learning
provides the best prediction of learning results at an individual level); Aric P.
Shafran, Learning in Games with Risky Payoffs, 75 GAMES & ECONOMIC
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and belief learning models.69 EWA learning describes a whole
family of learning strategies and comprises both reinforcement and
belief learning as boundary cases.70 In empirical studies, EWA
learning shows great precision in predicting individual learning
behavior; in fact, it fares better than any other comparable game
theory model.71
At a structural level, it is important to see that EWA learning
allows for both the reinforcement of one’s own actions and for the
observation of other players and their strategies. It is thus
consonant with modern versions of social cognitive learning theory
which, as we have seen, deal with the reinforcement effects both of
one’s own and others’ actions (direct and vicarious
reinforcement).72 The success of EWA learning suggests that
humans use their own experience as well as observation of others
when adapting to new circumstances. EWA learning further shows
that advanced economic modeling and empirical testing vindicates
the psychological findings that stress the relevance of both
reinforcement and observation for learning. These two pillars
should therefore guide legal processes of learning as well.
2. Organizational Learning
Private and public organizations are also a locus for learning.
Organizational learning is the process of creating, retaining, and
transferring knowledge within an organization with the aim of
BEHAVIOR 354, 357 (2012) (noting that EWA learning draws on features of
belief and reinforcement learning and thus optimally adapts to real learning
behavior in games).
69 Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, Experienced-Weighted Attraction
Learning in Normal Form Games, 67 ECONOMETRICA 827, 829 (1999). For
more recent developments, see Teck-Hua Ho et al., Self-Tuning Experience
Weighted Attraction Learning in Games, 133 J. ECON. THEORY 177 (2007).
70 CAMERER, supra note 2, at 269.
71 Id. at 308, 332 (noting that EWA learning predicts best in 85-90% of the
studies, with the exception of games with mixed equilibria); Chmura et al.,
supra note 1 (reporting on the self-tuning variety of EWA learning).
72 See BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY, supra note 42, at 3–5.
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making an organization better, for example by increasing
efficiency of production, accuracy, or profits.73
a. Interconnections between Individuals and
the Environment
The typical issue in organizational behavior is one that
characterizes all fields of the social sciences, namely the
interaction between the person and his or her internal cognition
(agency), and environment (structure).74 Four strands have been
developed that give different weight to the importance of person
and environment within an organization, and as a result yield
different interpretations on how learning develops within an
organization. First, some theories explain organizational behavior
and learning mainly as a function of the person.75 Second, other
theories explain behavior and learning mainly as a function of the
organization’s environment.76 Third, the compromise position
adopts the stance that organizational behavior is a function of both
the person and the environment.77 Finally, a new theory has
73 See CYERT&MARCH, supra note 2, at 172.
74 See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY:
OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION 5–28 (1984) (explaining the
relationship between agency and structure); FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GAMES REAL
ACTORS PLAY: ACTOR-CENTERED INSTITUTIONALISM IN POLICY RESEARCH 10–
12 (1997) (discussing structure and agency as complementary rather than
mutually exclusive explanatory approaches); DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK
POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION 44–69 (2008) (bringing the
two concepts together and developing the ideas of “sociability” and
“sovereignty”).
75 See, e.g., ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY
(1954) (dealing with the subject of the nature of human fulfillment and the
significance of personal relationships, and implementing a conceptualization of
self-actualization); VICTOR H. VROOM, WORK AND MOTIVATION (1964)
(explaining why individuals choose to follow certain courses of action in
organizations); Edwin A. Locke, Toward a Theory of Task Motivation and
Incentives, 3 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 157, 157–89
(1968) (dealing with the relationship between individuals’ conscious goals and
intentions and task performance).
76 See B. F., SKINNER, SCIENCE ANDHUMAN BEHAVIOR 129–141 (1953).
77 See, e.g., LYMAN W. PORTER & EDWARD E. LAWLER, MANAGERIAL
ATTITUDES AND PERFORMANCE (1968) (developing a multivariate model,
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developed more recently: Tim Davis and Fred Luthans make social
learning the center of an organizational behavior theory that
complements the previously mentioned approaches and draws
heavily on Bandura’s social learning theory.78 Hence, social
learning, with its dual focus on reinforcement and observation, can
be applied not only at the individual level, including in game
theory, but also in organizations.
Beyond the interplay between the individual and environment,
there are a number of other important aspects of “organizational
learning.” Three classical characteristics of learning organizations
can be drawn from behavioral studies of organizations.79 First,
behavior within an organization is based on routines:80 “forms,
rules, procedures, conventions, strategies, and technologies around
which organizations are constructed” that are “independent of the
individual actors who execute them.”81 Organizational learning is
the result of “encoding inferences from history into routines that
guide behavior.”82 Second, “organizational actions are history-
dependent,” meaning that “routines are based on interpretations of
the past more than [on] anticipations of the future.”83 Third,
organizations are target-oriented.84 Their behavior depends on the
relation between observed outcomes and their aspirations. Thus,
the individual, the environment, their interaction, routines, history,
and targets determine organizations’ learning capabilities.
according to which individual behavior is determined by a combination of
factors in the individual and in the environment).
78 See Tim R. V. Davis & Fred Luthans, A Social Learning Approach to
Organizational Behavior, 5 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 281 (1980); see also supra
Section I.A.2.
79 Barbara Levitt & James G. March, Organizational Learning, 15 ANN.
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b. Management Theory
Finally, management theory has also made a distinguished
contribution to the study of learning. A seminal concept is that of
Peter Senge, who developed a theory on the “learning
organization” that draws on theories of organizational learning, but
combines and adds to them in several respects.85 In Senge’s work,
the learning organization is juxtaposed to a “controlling
organization” that is organized in a vertical command-and-control
way; a style of organization and management which, according to
Senge, still characterizes almost every organization.86 The learning
organization is distinguished by creating a community that learns
to learn together.87 This is precisely the development the law
should seek to increasingly facilitate, both within companies and
regulatory agencies.
The learning organization is based on five disciplines;88 the
two most important in this context are dialogue, and systems
thinking.89 Dialogue in the organization should involve a team
genuinely thinking together given that the team, and not
individuals, are the fundamental learning unit in modern
organizations.90 Systems thinking is the “Fifth Discipline” that also
inspired the title of Senge’s book. Business and other human
activities are, according to Senge, systems that are bound by
85 PETERM. SENGE, THE FIFTHDISCIPLINE: THEART AND PRACTICE OF THE
LEARNING ORGANIZATION 3 (1990, 2d. ed 2006) [hereinafter SENGE, THE FIFTH
DISCIPLINE]; see also SENGE ET AL., THE DANCE OF CHANGE, supra note 1
(showing how to accelerate success in organizations and avoid the obstacles that
can stall the momentum of change).
86 SENGE, THE FIFTHDISCIPLINE, supra note 85, at 5.
87 See id. at 4; see also Levitt & March, supra note 79, at 332 (discussing
the concept of learning to learn together).
88 SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE, supra note 85, at 129–216 (explaining
that the five disciplines are: (a) personal mastery; (b) mental models; (c)
building shared vision; (d) team learning; and (e) systems thinking; see also
SOC’Y FOR ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: N. AM., (last visited July 12, 2017),
http://www.solonline.org/?page=Abt_OrgLearning (providing rich material on
the five disciplines of the learning organization).
89 The other disciplines are personal mastery, mental models, and building
a shared vision. SENGE, THE FIFTHDISCIPLINE, supra note 85, at 129–216.
90 Id. at 236.
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various interrelated actions. It is thus important for an organization
to focus not on isolated parts of the system, but on the overall
operations of the organization and on all the other disciplines at the
same time. Systems thinking integrates the other disciplines, fusing
them into a coherent body of theory and practice. At the same time,
the other four disciplines should be conducive to realizing the
organization’s potential. This way of thinking should then
eventually lead individuals to shape and change the organization.91
As such, learning within the learning organization goes well
beyond “survival” or “adaptive learning” since it gives the
organization the ability to not only excel at passive reception of
external input, but also to continually expand its capacity to create
its future. Adaptive learning must be joined by “generative
learning” that enhances the capacity to create.92
C. Individual and Social Learning: A Black Hole in the
Legal Literature
How can the legal discipline make sense of and integrate these
findings into specific legal analysis? To motivate this inquiry, we
will first show that contemporary legal thought is missing a
systematic approach to learning. Legal analysis is plagued by
incoherent approaches to learning; it is either ignored, dismissed as
irrelevant, or emphatically embraced in order to declare the
irrelevance of behavioral biases.93 We highlight law and
economics and behavioral law and economics as examples.
1. Law and Economics
In law and economics, individual agents are generally assumed
to learn, but there is no recognition of the prerequisites for and the
limits of learning.94 Learning is usually understood as individual
91 Id. at 11–12.
92 Id. at 14.
93 TILMAN SLEMBECK, UNIV. ST. GALLEN DEP’T. ECON., LEARNING IN
ECONOMICS: WHERE DO WE STAND? A BEHAVIORAL VIEW ON LEARNING IN
THEORY, PRACTICE AND EXPERIMENTS, Discussion Paper no. 9007 1–19 (1999).
94 Richard Posner, for example, drops an occasional, yet unqualified
reference to the role of habits in “learning by doing” in order to downplay the
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learning in a social context, often in terms of the game theoretic
adaptation to an equilibrium strategy.95 Richard Posner even cites
“learning by doing” as a reason to punish repeat offenders more
severely, since he assumes that criminals will get better at hiding
their offenses by repeating criminal activity.96
This unqualified understanding of human behavior has
consequences for the paradigm of regulation promoted by classical
law and economics. Social learning is undoubtedly a legitimate
aim of any regulatory effort.97 Thus, the question becomes “how
can regulation facilitate social learning?”98 However, it is at least
equally important that regulators themselves improve their learning
capabilities. As economist Friedrich Hayek rightly identified,
governments might introduce substantively erroneous regulation
simply because they lack sufficient information, a so-called
knowledge problem.99 Nonetheless, law and economics scholarship
tends to underanalyze learning’s cognitive limits and intricate
motivations while providing elegant formal models theoretically
capturing the interaction between different agents.100 Law and
economics thus often fails to acknowledge that agents in practice
must overcome a number of cognitive and motivational limitations
importance of the endowment effect. See Richard Posner, Rational Choice,
Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1566–67 (1998).
For further examples of learning in the law and economics literature see, e.g.,
David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis
of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1986); Alan Schwartz &
Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 659 (1979).
95 See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW& ECON. 36, 300 (6th
ed. 2011) (suggesting that players “probably” learn from bad experiences and
therefore adapt their behavior in future rounds of a game to approximate
equilibrium strategies); see also infra note 96.
96 RICHARDA. POSNER, ECONOMICANALYSIS OF LAW 269 (9th ed., 2014).
97 Cf. Cento Veljanovski, Strategic Use of Regulation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 87, 94 (Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin
Lodge eds., 2010) (stressing “learning as an important feature of regulation in
practice”).
98 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1407.
99 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM.
ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1945).
100 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1406–9.
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to engage in learning.101 This literature also tends to overlook the
interrelation between individual and organizational learning, and
the latter’s importance for effective regulation.102
2. Behavioral Law and Economics
Learning is not thoroughly investigated in behavioral law and
economics literature, either; it is either overlooked, or invoked to
resist behavioral regulation per se.103 Professor Cass Sunstein
mentions learning as one of the five possible welfarist objections to
libertarian paternalism.104 Joshua Wright and Douglas Ginsburg, in
their critique of behavioral law and economics, object to
behavioral strategies on the basis that they impede learning by the
involved actors.105
The critiques of behavioral law and economics from a learning
perspective thus take a dual shape. First, there is the banality
argument, that learning does not matter at all for important
decisions. There is also the cancellation argument, where critics
claim that since learning does occur, it speaks against the ubiquity
of biases sometimes postulated by the behavioral literature. We
shall briefly take up these partly contradictory concerns in turn.
First, the banality argument: some of the most important
decisions, such as going to college, the decision whether to get
married and whom to marry, as well as major investments such as
buying a house, are made so infrequently that there is little chance
101 See sources cited supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
102 For more on the importance of institutional learning, see Jon Stern, The
Evaluation of Regulatory Agencies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
REGULATION 223 (Robert Baldwin et al. eds., 2010) (stressing evaluation as a
tool of learning and improving regulatory outcomes); see also supra Section
I.B.2.
103 See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is
not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1170 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein &
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism]; Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 4; Mario J.
Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism
BRIGHAMYOUNGU. L. REV. 905, 943–946 (2009).
104 Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and
Paternalism, 122 YALE L. J. 1826, 1869–70 (2013). The other four are
information, competition, heterogeneity and public choice. See id. at 1868–72.
105 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1070–1075.
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for learning from these experiences.106 Thus, learning is
supposedly reduced to more banal, everyday actions. This
argument, however, overlooks that many smaller decisions can add
up to having a massive impact. For instance, if you lose ten dollars
per month because you failed to adapt your cell phone contract to
your actual calling behavior,107 that will cost you $1200 over ten
years. And this is only one of many actions in which people
regularly lose money or free time by not acting optimally.108 Thus,
the actions in which learning matters are not trivial but rather at the
very heart of the daily economic decisions we make.
Second, the cancellation argument states that learning
effectively cancels out biases over time in the cases in which they
are relevant.109 In real life, outside of laboratory experiments,
people will learn over time, thus self-debias. Therefore, behavioral
scholarship is wrong to claim that biases are likely to have a
significant impact on behavior; they are “learned away.”110 While
this is theoretically possible, empirical research suggests that
learning is subject to some necessary conditions that are rarely
106 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychological Foundations of Behavioral Law
and Economics, U. ILL. L. REV. 1675, 1686 (2011); see Sunstein & Thaler,
Libertarian Paternalism, supra note 103, at 4–5, 9–12.
107 See BAR-GILL, supra note 3, at ch. 4 (presenting a careful legal and
empirical analysis of biases in cell phone contracting).
108 See, e.g., id. at chs. 2–3 (discussing how individuals regularly lose
money and time in the context of applying for mortgages and credit cards);
GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE
ECONOMICS OF MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION (2015) (explaining how
consumers are tricked into spending money in numerous contexts such as when
buying homes, cars, tobacco, and alcohol).
109 See John List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?,
118 Q. J. ECON. 41, 71 (2003); Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1045; see
also Devin G. Pope & Maurice E. Schweitzer, Is Tiger Woods Risk Averse?
Persistent Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes, 101
AM. ECON. REV. 129 (2011) (showing how, in the real-world example of
professional golf players, learning did not eradicate bias despite high stakes and
competitive environments).
110 See, e.g., Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 103 (noting ways in which self-
debiasing might overcome biases); Sunstein, supra note 104, at 1869–70
(discussing learning as a potential source of overcoming bias, and some nudges
as preventing learning); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Expert Paternalism, 64 FLA. L.
REV. 721, 743–44 (2012) (describing limits to self-debiasing).
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present.111 The agents must be motivated to change their behavior.
This can be unlikely, particularly in the case of biases that are
conducive to enjoying life and coping with problems, such as
optimism bias. People also fail to recognize the need for behavior
change, and learning, if they believe that they are already pursuing
an optimal strategy and that only others are subject to error and
biases.112 For the conscious pursuit of learning strategies, self-
conscious insight is necessary. Moreover, even unconscious
learning patterns are subject to constraints. For example, it has
been shown that overconfidence is only diminished by learning if
personalized, clear feedback is given on a number of occasions.113
In real life, these conditions are often unmet.114 In fact, many of
the studies in the behavioral literature in which biases were
identified were conducted with law and business students whose
education had given them ample opportunity and incentives to
develop optimal bargaining and decision-making procedures.115
Field studies with experts as participants confirm that even
experience, and thus ample learning opportunities, do not guard
against bias;116 even seasoned diplomats are subject to important
111 See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 110, at 743–44.
112 Timothy D. Wilson et al., Mental Contamination and the Debiasing
Problem, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 185, 190 (Thomas Gilovich et al., eds., 2002).
113 Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS ANDBIASES 422, 437 (Daniel Kahnemann et al., eds., 1982).
114 SeeWilson et al., supra note 112, at 200. This holds particularly true for
investment decisions on the stock market, see Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology
and Economics. Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON. LIT. 315, 330, 365 (2009).
115 Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining
Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 121–22
(1997) (discussing the self-serving bias).
116 See, e.g., Derek J. Koehler et al., The Calibration of Expert Judgment, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 686
(Thomas Gilovich et al., eds., 2002); Oren Perez, Can Experts be Trusted and
What Can be Done About It? Insights from the Biases and Heuristics Literature,
in NUDGE AND THE LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 115 (Alberto Alemanno &
Anne-Lise Sibony eds., 2015).
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biases.117 Learning effects thus do not follow automatically from
mistakes.118
Many lessons can be drawn from the treatment of learning in
behavioral law and economics. First, learning does have the
potential of debiasing actors; in situations in which this is deemed
a normative goal, learning should be given a greater role. Second,
learning is a tricky business; it is context-dependent and does not
follow automatically from mistakes. Rather, some prerequisites
such as clear and continuous feedback are necessary for successful
learning. Generally, learning is an important, yet underrepresented,
variable in achieving better outcomes in the real world. Behavioral
scholarship thus stands to benefit from paying close attention to
learning theory.
Learning matters, particularly if interdisciplinary law expands
its narrow focus to include social psychology; but it is an intricate
process that needs monitoring and institutionalization if it is to
show legally tangible results. The remainder of the Article thus
attempts to outline these structures and identify concrete
opportunities for learning in the law, both in the international and
national sphere.
II. INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES TO
BEHAVIORAL REGULATION AND LEARNING
The influence of behavioral law and economics on public
policymaking has been so great that it has spread to international
institutions. Behavioral regulation is relevant to international and
regional organizations on two levels: they may be involved in
behavioral regulation themselves, as the World Trade Organization
is,119 or encourage behavioral regulation at the domestic level, as
the World Bank does.120 Behavioral regulation is subject to even
more intense debate in domestic regulation in the United States and
the European Union. Therefore, the following section visits several
examples of behavioral regulation from an international and
117 See Poulsen & Aisbett, supra note 60, at 273.
118 Blumenthal, supra note 110; Wilson et al., supra note 112, at 189.
119 See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
120 See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
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comparative perspective to show how insights from learning theory
are often missing.
A. Behavioral Regulation and Learning in International
Law
There is surprisingly little literature on the influence of
behavioral economics and cognitive psychology on international
law.121 At the same time, the vast literature on international
regulation and global administrative law shows that international
law has long assumed a regulatory role with a major impact on the
behavior of domestic governments and individuals at both the
international and domestic governance level.122 International law
preshapes several decisions of domestic governments, sometimes
in the form of nudges.123
International law analyses based on the assumption of perfect
rationality dominate in the United States,124 and more legal
121 See Anne van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and Economics, 55
HARV. INT’L L. J. 421 (2014); Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 1099 (2015). What little literature there is focuses on how
behavioral law and economics research could have an influence on international
law. However, the relevant literature is increasing; other literature introducing
insights of behavioral law and economics into different aspects of international
law and international relations includes: Georgios Dimitropoulos, Behavioural
Regulation in International Trade, in NUDGING – POSSIBILITIES, LIMITATIONS,
AND APPLICATIONS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND ECON. 263 (Klaus Mathis &
Avishalom Tor eds., 2016) [hereinafter Dimitropoulos, Behavioural Regulation
in International Trade]; Jean Galbraith, Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral
Understanding of Treaty Design, 53 VA J. INT’L L. 309 (2013) (taking a
behavioral approach to international treaty formation); Poulsen & Aisbett, supra
note 60; Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of
Modern Investment Treaties, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 1 (2013)
(studying the effect of the availability bias in the diffusion of investment
treaties).
122 See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law, 68 LAW&CONTEMP. PROBS. 376 (2005).
123 See infra Section II.B.2.
124 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH& ERICA. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INT’L LAW 3
(2005); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY viv (2008); ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECON.
FOUNDATIONS OF INT’L LAW 3 (2013); JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECON.
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approaches to international law are dominant in Europe.125 In the
same way that rational choice theory in domestic law assumes
rationality for individuals, rational choice approaches of both
international relations and law and economics usually assume that
states are rational and unitary actors.126 Accordingly, the
behavioral law and economics paradigm can be transposed to the
international level as well. Anne van Aaken identifies three pillars
on which “Behavioral International Law and Economics” could
draw: economic analysis of international law, behavioral
economics, and political psychology in international relations.127 It
can be assumed also for states, individuals, and groups that act at
the international level that their behavior is also bounded, and that
biases and heuristics impact their choices and decisions. First,
government decisions are made by agents that are subject to the
same biases as the ones identified at the domestic level for
individual decisionmakers; hence, states are acting in a boundedly
rational manner.128 Secondly, one could add that not all decisions
in international law are taken by the states and for the states. There
are several more individual and collective decisionmakers in
international law like international judges and courts, heads of
international organizations, nongovernmental organizations
(“NGOs”), private governance regimes, and intergovernmental
networks. Thus, even if states for some reason acted more
rationally than the officials representing them, there would still be
ample room for boundedly rational behavior by other, nonstate
STRUCTURE OF INT’L LAW 1 (2009); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman,
Economic Analysis of International Law: An Invitation and a Caveat, 24 YALE
J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (1999).
125 See Georg Nolte, Public International Law and Economics: Concluding
Remarks to the Bonn Conference, U. ILL. L. REV. 429 (2008) (contrasting U.S.
and European approaches to international law).
126 See van Aaken, supra note 121, at 441.
127 Id. at 421.
128 See Broude, supra note 121, at 1114; see also Brad L. LeVeck et al.,
The Role of Self-Interest in Elite Bargaining, 111 PNAS 18536 (2014) (showing
that experienced diplomats, in negotiating international treaties, behave in a
boundedly rational way); Poulsen & Aisbett, supra note 60 (showcasing
cognitive biases in the field of international investment law).
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actors. Finally, there is solid evidence that collectives, like states
and NGOs, are subject to similar biases as individuals.129
B. Case Studies from International Law
Various international organizations are currently considering
how the insights from behavioral sciences could support policy
making at the domestic and international level. In the field of
international development especially, behavioral insights and
policy design methods such as randomized control trials (“RCTs”)
are proliferating.130 This section discusses the role of behavioral
law and economics in this discussion, using the World Bank and
the World Trade Organization as examples.
1. The World Bank
The World Bank is leading the transposition of behavioral
insights into international policymaking. The World Bank helped,
for example, run an RCT in Guatemala.131 The United Kingdom
Behavioural Insights Team (“UK BIT”) conducted the RCT, which
129 See IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 1 (1972); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKE
GROUPS SMARTER 7–9, 49–51 (2014); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?
Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale L.J. 71, 73–75 (2000) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble]; David Schkade, et al., When Deliberation
Produces Extremism, 22 CRITICAL REVIEW 227 (2010).
130 See MARKWHITEHEAD ET AL., NUDGING ALL OVER THEWORLD, 28–29
(2014),
https://changingbehaviours.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/nudgedesignfinal.pdf.
RCTs are increasingly used in international development to compare cost-
effectiveness of different interventions for boosting growth and tackling poverty.
131 For more information see Josh Howgege, How Behavioural Science
could Revamp Development, SCI DEV NET (Dec. 22, 2014)
http://www.scidev.net/global/policy/feature/behavioural-science-development-
policy-innovation.html; Simon Ruda, Results from BIT tax trial in Guatemala,
BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS TEAM (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.behaviouralinsights.c
o.uk/international/results-from-bit-tax-trial-in-guatemala/; BIT Staff, BIT first
trial in Latin America goes live!, BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS TEAM (May 29, 2014),
http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/international/bit-first-trial-in-latin-america
-goes-live/.
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was the first trial that BIT ran in the international development
context.132
Importantly, the subject of the 2015 World Development
Report (“WDR”) is the introduction of behavioral insights into
development policy.133 The 2015 WDR, entitled “Mind, Society,
and Behavior,” was launched in December 2014 by Jim Yong
Kim, the President of the World Bank, and David Halpern of UK
BIT.134 The WDR’s purpose was to foster the improvement of
development policies through an emphasis on understanding and
changing human behavior.135 It has a broader interdisciplinary
approach than most other behavioral studies, and draws on
neuroscience, cognitive and social psychology, behavioral
economics, sociology, political science, and anthropology.136 The
WDR attempts to show how to address various development
challenges and to shape a new agenda for the development
community.137 It introduces new ways of thinking and discusses
new interventions that are relevant for development policy, and
also deals with the behavior of development professionals.138
Drawing on insights from various behavioral and social
sciences concerning decision making, the WDR identifies three
major ways of thinking that are relevant for the design and
implementation of development policy: “thinking automatically,”
“thinking socially,” and “thinking with mental models.”139
Thinking automatically means that people make most of their
132 See Stewart Kettle et al., Behavioural Insights to Improve Tax
Compliance: Short-Term Impacts from a Randomised Experiment in Guatemala,
CMPO Working Paper (2015). The trial tested redesigned reminder letters to
taxpayers in Guatemala who had failed to declare their income tax on time and
reported an increase in payment by the behaviorally informed taxpayers of 43%.
133 The World Development Report is an analysis of a specific aspect of
economic development published each year by the World Bank. See generally
WORLD BANK GRP., WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2015: MIND, SOCIETY, AND




137 See id. at 2–3.
138 See id. at 3.
139 Id. at 3, 24–75
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judgments and choices in a nondeliberative way;140 thinking
socially implies that people usually think and act based on what
other people around them think and do;141 and thinking with
mental models suggests that individuals within a society share
common perspectives on making sense of the world around them
and understanding themselves.142
These insights are extremely important for the design of
regulatory interventions. Understanding how people think and
behave has an influence on the regulatory tools and strategies for
promoting development and combating poverty. The WDR points
to new tools for achieving development objectives, and new means
of increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of existing
interventions.143 It facilitates connections between modes of
decision making and new interventions that can help households to
save more, firms to increase productivity, communities to reduce
the prevalence of disease, parents to improve the cognitive
development of children, and consumers to save energy.144
The WDR also focuses on the internal operations of the World
Bank and other international and domestic development
organizations.145 It recognizes that development professionals and
policy makers, like other individuals, are subject to various biases
stemming from preconceived frameworks of thinking.146 The
World Bank and similar organizations can introduce measures to
mitigate these biases by, for example, diagnosing the mindsets of
the people that they are trying to help in a more rigorous and
140 See DANIELKAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–22 (2011).
141 See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The
Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 485 (1985).
142 See Arthur T. Denzau & Douglas C. North, Shared Mental Models:
Ideologies and Institutions, 47 KYKLOS 3, 3 (1994); see also Paul DiMaggio,
Culture and Cognition, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 263, 265 (1997) (suggesting
individuals behave in accordance with strategy of how they make sense of the
world).
143 SeeWORLDBANKGRP., supra note 133.
144 See id.
145 See generally id. at 179–201 (noting that the World Development
Report studied World Bank employees and development professionals generally
for biases).
146 See id.
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precise way and introducing processes to reduce the effect of
biases on internal deliberations.147
The 2015 WDR advances policy-related research by exploring
the possible development of nontraditional regulatory interventions
at the international and the domestic level. However, it fails to
consider social science research on learning. The road taken thus
leads in the right direction, but is incompletely built. Institutional
support of these initiatives, as suggested in Part III of the article,
could help operationalize these achievements and lead to the
development of sustainable solutions in the field of international
development.
2. The World Trade Organization
International trade law presents another interesting example of
the interplay between behavioral regulation and international law.
International trade law has employed some of the nudging
instruments proposed by behavioral law and economics to
encourage changes in behavior that commonly deviate from the
predictions of rational choice theory. The World Trade
Organization’s (“WTO”) Sanitary and Phytosanitary (“SPS”)
Agreement,148 and the Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT”)
Agreement149 in particular go beyond addressing issues of
antidiscrimination of foreign products in international trade and
aim for positive market integration through harmonization of
national standards150 by using the instruments of behavioral
147 See id. at xii.
148 The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement), WORLD TRADEORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm (last visited July 12, 2017) [hereinafter SPS
Agreement].
149 Uruguay Round Agreement, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
WORLD TRADEORG. (Apr. 15, 1994), https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal
_e/17-tbt_e.htm [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
150 See Gabrielle Marceau & Joel P. Trachtman, The Technical Barriers to
Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World Trade
Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 811
(2002); Panagiotis Delimatsis, ‘Relevant International Standards’ and
‘Recognized Standardization Bodies’ under the TBT Agreement, TILBURG
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regulation—such as disclosure of better information, legal default
rules, and debiasing through law—to nudge governments towards
specific regulatory policies. The SPS and TBT Agreements show a
preference and nudge towards the use of science and the use of
international standards in international trade.151 This happens even
in the absence of a centralized social planner—as is the case in
international trade. The SPS Agreement nudges governments
towards the use of science over politics in decision-making, and
towards the use of scientific reasoning over discursive or other
types of reasoning.152 The TBT Agreement also uses nudges to
steer governments towards the use of international technical
standards as technical specifications for domestic products and
towards the introduction of private administrative systems in the
place of domestic legislation and domestic administrative
systems.153 This happens primarily with the use of disclosure
obligations and legal default rules.154
L.ECON. CTR., Discussion Paper 1, 11 (2014); see also Robert Howse & Joanna
Langille, Permitting Pluralism: The Seal Products Dispute and Why the WTO
Should Accept Trade Restrictions Justified by Noninstrumental Moral Values,
37 YALE J. INT’L LAW 367, 368 (2012) (discussing WTO trade restrictions and
morality).
151 See GEORGIOS DIMITROPOULOS, ZERTIFIZIERUNG UND
AKKREDITIERUNG IM INTERNATIONALENVERWALTUNGSVERBUND 77–91 (2012).
With the SPS and the TBT Agreements, the WTO has introduced a risk-
assessment process and a type of science informed policymaking that is also
favored in the nudge literature; see, e.g., David A. Dana, A Behavioral
Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1315
(2003) (explaining the relationship between behavioral economics and science
informed policymaking).
152 See SPS Agreement, supra note 148, at Article 5 (laying out the risk
assessment procedure for the determination of the appropriate level of Sanitary
or phytosanitary protection).
153 See DIMITROPOULOS, supra note 151, at 77–91, 224–53.
154 See, e.g., SPS Agreement, supra note 148, at Article 3(2) (“Sanitary or
phytosanitary measures which conform to international standards, guidelines or
recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of
this Agreement and of GATT 1994”); TBT Agreement, supra note 149, at
Article 2.5 (“A Member preparing, adopting or applying a technical regulation
which may have a significant effect on trade of other Members shall, upon the
request of another Member, explain the justification for that technical regulation
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Altering legal default rules is one of the most important
debiasing instruments that can be found in the behavioral
regulation toolkit. For various reasons including laziness,
procrastination, fear, and distraction, most people will take the
options that require the least effort, or the least resistance. This is
what is known as “status quo bias;” if there is a default option for
the chooser, then we should expect that a large number of people
will select that option regardless of whether it is good for them.155
In the WTO, a paradigmatic case of changing defaults has been the
change of the decision-making rule in the dispute settlement
process from positive consensus, an opt-in rule, to negative
consensus, an opt-out rule,156 that completely changed the nature
of the dispute resolution process.157 The SPS and TBT Agreements
make use of this regulatory approach by introducing several
presumptions in favor of specific international regulatory solutions
instead of domestic ones. A first presumption in the SPS
Agreement, found in Article 2(4), concerns the obligations of the
WTO members under the provisions of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) 1994, especially Article XX(b), as the
measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health” under Article XX(b) largely overlap with the relevant SPS
measures. Domestic SPS measures that are in conformity with the
SPS Agreement are presumed to be in accordance with the
obligations of the WTO Members under the provisions of GATT
1994. A second presumption, directly related to the first, is found
in Article 3(2), according to which SPS measures that “conform
in terms of the provisions of paragraphs 2 to 4. Whenever a technical regulation
is prepared, adopted or applied for one of the legitimate objectives explicitly
mentioned in paragraph 2, and is in accordance with relevant international
standards, it shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle
to international trade”).
155 The choice of defaults can of course be very controversial. See Richard
H. Thaler et al., Choice Architecture, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PUB. POLICY 428, 430–431 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2012).
156 Specifically, Articles 16.4 and Article 17.14 of the Agreement provide
an opt-out rule with respect to the adoption of Panel and Appellate Body reports
of the WTO. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, WORLD TRADEORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop
_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm (last visited July 12, 2017).
157 See van Aaken, supra note 121, at 450.
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to” international standards, guidelines, or recommendations are
presumed to be necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or
health, and are also presumed to be consistent with the SPS
Agreement and GATT 1994.158
The TBT Agreement also includes many presumptions in favor
of international trade. Per Article 2.5, when a domestic technical
regulation is prepared, adopted, or applied for a legitimate
objective and is “in accordance with” relevant international
standards, it shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an
unnecessary obstacle to international trade; it thus creates a safe
harbor for such technical regulations.159 Similar presumptions in
favor of international standardization are found in relation to
domestic standards and conformity assessment procedures.160
Moreover, Article 2.8 and Paragraph I of the Code of Good
Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of
Standards in Annex 3 to the TBT Agreement presume that product
design requirements and descriptive characteristics of products are
(potentially) more trade restrictive than requirements that relate to
a product’s performance.161 For this reason, performance
requirements for products are favored over design and descriptive
characteristics.
The presumptions of both Agreements favor the use of
international standards by domestic regulators and, as such, also
international harmonization. But international harmonization may
not always be the preferable regulatory solution for all states and
for all cases of products given that producers in different countries
may be using different production techniques. Still, as the relevant
research on default rules shows, legal defaults can be extremely
sticky;162 once a default rule has been established, the status quo
bias makes individuals hesitant to deviate from the default option.
158 SPS Agreement, supra note 148, at Article 3(2).
159 See James H. Mathis, The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, 16 CONSUMER POL’Y REV. 14, 17 (2006).
160 See TBT Agreement, supra note 149, at Articles 5, 7 and 8.
161 See Arkady Kudryavtsev, The TBT Agreement in Context, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 17, 69 (Tracey
Epps & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013).
162 Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default
Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 651–52 (2006).
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This is particularly relevant in the international legal order, where
respect for state sovereignty is fundamental.163 The SPS and TBT
Agreements favor international solutions that may not always be
considered legitimate, due to their balancing of governmental
concerns in matters such as protection of health, the environment,
and consumers, on the one hand, and the idea of a liberal economic
order, on the other.164 By setting technical but highly sticky
defaults in favor of the international standards, the Agreements
contemporaneously set a political default in favor of a more liberal
economic order. This has added to the WTO’s legitimacy crisis,165
especially given the fact that the default rule in favor of
international trade is an implicit one, which is very difficult to
contest.
One possible solution could be to preserve the status quo by
adding learning mechanisms that are currently largely absent from
the WTO framework. The Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(“TPRM”) could develop into such a mechanism.166 The TPRM
includes a review that is based on a self-assessment of the WTO
members and an assessment by the WTO Secretariat, which is then
discussed in the Trade Policy Review Body in which all WTO
members take part.167 The TPRM could be reformed into a
debiasing and continuous learning facility of the WTO by
introducing some simple modifications in the institutional setup to
integrate systemic learning.
163 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (“[T]he Organization is based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”).
164 Markus Wagner, Interpreting the SPS Agreement: Navigating Risk,
Scientific Evidence and Regulatory Autonomy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
WTODISPUTE SETTLEMENT (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2).
165 See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy
Crisis, 1 WORLD TRADEREV. 7 (2002) (discussing WTO’s legitimacy crisis).
166 See Trade Policy Review Mechanism (“TPRM”), WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/annex3_e.htm (last visited July 12,
2017).
167 See id. See generally Joseph F. Francois, Trade Policy Transparency
and Investor Confidence: Some Implications for an Effective Trade Policy
Review Mechanism, 9 REV. INT’L ECON. 303 (2001); Sam Laird, The WTO’s
Trade Policy Review Mechanism – From Through the Looking Glass, 22
WORLD ECON. 741 (1999).
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C. Learning in a Comparative Perspective: Behavioral
Regulation in the United States and the European
Union
Increasingly, regulatory agencies in the United States and in
the European Union use behavioral insights to design more
effective regulation.168 In theory, the agendas of behavioral
regulation, both in the United States and the European Union, are
committed to facilitating learning—a promise that is often not
redeemed in concrete cases of regulation.
1. The United States: OIRA and Executive Orders
13563 and 13707
In the United States, a behavioral approach to regulation has
been driven by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(“OIRA”).169 Furthermore, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau170 has spearheaded a number of studies that draw on
168 For the U.S., see Philipp Hacker, The Behavioral Divide. A Critique of
the Differential Implementation of Behavioral Law and Economics in the US
and the EU, 11 EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 299, 310–11 (2015) [hereinafter
Hacker, The Behavioral Divide]. For the increasing uptake of behavioral
economics in European regulatory policy, see JOANNA SOUSA LOURENCO ET AL.,
BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS APPLIED TO POLICY EUROPEAN REPORT 2016,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 4 (2016), http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repos
itory/bitstream/JRC100146/kjna27726enn_new.pdf; KRISTEN ERTA ET AL.,
APPLYING BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AT THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY,
OCCASIONAL PAPERNO. 1 1 (2013), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/
occasional-papers/occasional-paper-1.pdf; FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY,
ECONOMICS FOR EFFECTIVE REGULATION, OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 13 3 (2016),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/occassional-paper-13.pdf
[hereinafter FCA, ECONOMICS FOR EFFECTIVE REGULATION].
169 Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Administrator of the OIRA, for
the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies regarding Disclosure and
Simplification as Regulatory Tools (June 18, 2010) (on file with Administrator
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs), https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/disclosure_principles.pdf
[hereinafter Sunstein Memorandum].
170 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12
U.S.C. § 5491 (2010); see also Pamela Foohey, Calling on the CFPB for Help:
Telling Stories and Consumer Protection, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 177, 177–78
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behavioral economics to improve the effect of regulation.171 This is
a response to Executive Order 13563, signed by President Obama
to integrate behavioral law and economics as a key tool for public
policy in the United States within OIRA and the Office of
Management and Budget (“OMB”).172 Moreover, Executive Order
13707, titled “Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve
the American People,” also alludes to a review of existing
regulations in its Sections 1(b)(iv) and 1(c).173
EO 13563, Section 4 adds behaviorally informed regulatory
tools to the governmental toolbox under the rubric of “flexible
approaches.”174 Section 4 states in pertinent part:
[w]here relevant, feasible, and consistent with
regulatory objectives, and to the extent permitted by
law, each agency shall identify and consider
regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and
maintain flexibility and freedom of choice for the
public. These approaches include warnings,
appropriate default rules, and disclosure
requirements as well as provision of information to
the public in a form that is clear and intelligible.175
(noting that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has handled
more than a million complaints “regarding consumer financial product and
services” since its creation in 2011).
171 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE POWER OF LIGHT-TOUCH
FINANCIAL EDUCATION: A DEMONSTRATION WITH CREDIT CARD REVOLVERS 5
(January 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-
reports/power-light-touch-financial-education/; KLEIMANN COMMC’NGRP., INC.,
KNOW BEFORE YOU OWE: EVOLUTION OF THE INTEGRATED TILA-RESPA
DISCLOSURES 1 (July 2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_
report_tila-respa-testing.pdf; CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROT. BUREAU, CFPB
STUDY OFOVERDRAFT PROGRAMS (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/20
1306_cfpb_whitepaper_overdraft-practices.pdf.
172 See Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (2011).
173 Exec. Order No. 13707, 80 Fed. Reg. 56356 (2015); see Georgios
Dimitropoulos, Administrative Law 3.0, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Dec. 18,
2015), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/12/administrative-law-3-0/
[hereinafter Dimitropoulos, Administrative Law 3.0].
174 See Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (2011).
175 Id. at § 4.
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EO 13563, Section 6 requires government agencies to
continually improve its learning capabilities,176 and introduces
retrospective analyses of regulations as part of the agency’s
mission.177 Section 6(a) deals with retrospective analysis of
existing regulations, but it also introduces learning as an objective
of public policy:
To facilitate the periodic review of existing
significant regulations, agencies shall consider how
best to promote retrospective analysis of rules that
may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or
excessively burdensome, and to modify, streamline,
expand, or repeal them in accordance with what has
been learned. Such retrospective analyses,
including supporting data, should be released online
whenever possible.178
Section 6(b) further requires that agencies develop a plan for
continuous learning based on their experience with implementing
regulations.179 This plan, which should be consistent with the
agency’s legal framework, resources, and regulatory priorities,
must be submitted to OIRA.180 The purpose of this process is to
make the regulatory program of the agencies more effective and
less burdensome in achieving regulatory objectives.181
EO 13563 thus uses the tools of behavioral economics in
service of the continuous improvement of regulatory interventions.
The same concept of learning-based regulation has been adopted
by a Memorandum of the OMB entitled “Next Steps in the
Evidence and Innovation Agenda” that further aims at promoting
behaviorally inspired regulation.182 According to this document,
the Executive Office of the President should help agencies develop
176 Id. at § 6.
177 See id. at heading, “Retrospective Analyses of Existing Rules”.
178 Id. at § 6(a) (emphasis added).
179 Id. at § 6(b).
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Memorandum to the Heads of Departments and Agencies, M-13-17,
Next Steps in the Evidence and Innovation Agenda, OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (July 26, 2013) [hereinafter OMB
Memorandum].
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and strengthen proposals that catalyze innovation and learn about
policies that actually work.183 In order to achieve these learning
results, the OMB and White House policy councils have organized
workshops for the development of “learning agendas” for the
agencies;184 moreover, they aim at creating “cross-agency learning
networks” around specific policy issues to share relevant research
and develop shared evaluation strategies.185
2. The European Union: Test, Learn, Adapt
Behaviorally informed regulation has not yet developed in the
European Union to the extent that it has in the United States.186
However, behavioral insights are increasingly used by the
European Commission and national regulatory agencies.
The European Union has been especially involved in the
integration of behavioral economics in consumer and competition
policymaking.187 Some Directorate Generals (“DGs”) of the
European Commission, like the DG for Health and Consumer
183 Id. at 1, 8.
184 Id. at 12–14.
185 Id. at 10–11.
186 See Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony, The Emergence of
Behavioural Policy-Making: A European Perspective, in NUDGE AND THE LAW:
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 1, 20–21 (Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony
eds., 2015) (“As a (mass) producer of regulation, the EU is as yet making scarce
use of behavioural insights. Besides a few isolated initiatives displaying some
behavioural consideration . . . the EU has not yet shown a general commitment
to integrate behavioural research into policy-making.”); Hacker, The Behavioral
Divide, supra note 168, at 299; Philipp Hacker, More Behavioral vs. More
Economic Approach: Explaining the Behavioral Divide between the United
States and the European Union, 39 HASTINGS INT’L& COMP. L. REV. 355, 366–
388 (2016) [hereinafter Hacker, More Behavioral vs. More Economic
Approach].
187 See generally EMANUELE CIRIOLO, BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, OXERAAGENDA 1, 1–5 (2011),
http://www.oxera.com/Oxera/media/Oxera/downloads/Agenda/Behavioural-
economics-in-the-EC_1.pdf?ext=.pdf (showing the increasing integration of
behavioral economics at the European Commission and discussing a range of
case studies).
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Protection (“DG SANCO”), have pioneered efforts to develop and
apply behavioral knowledge in policymaking and regulation.188
Behavioral insights were first formally adopted by the
European Union in 2009, when the Directive on Consumer Rights
limited the right to use default options in consumer contracts.189
Article 22 on additional payments reads:
Before the consumer is bound by the contract or
offer, the trader shall seek the express consent of the
consumer to any extra payment in addition to the
remuneration agreed upon for the trader’s main
contractual obligation. If the trader has not obtained
the consumer’s express consent but has inferred it
by using default options which the consumer is
required to reject in order to avoid the additional
payment, the consumer shall be entitled to
reimbursement of this payment.190
Sellers are required to obtain express consent from consumers
for any payment in addition to payment for the main contractual
obligation and cannot rely on default options requiring buyers to
reject these options to avoid payment. For example, the Directive
bans preticked boxes in online consumer contracts, to prevent
consumers from inadvertently paying for unwanted services like
priority airplane boarding and travel insurance.
In 2013, the European Commission published a paper
discussing how behavioral insights can support regulatory efforts
of the European Union as well as individual member states.191 As
the Commission explains in the document, EU behavioral
regulation is not nudging in the strict sense since it mentions that
“the objective of a policy” may be “to change behavior [sic] for the
common good”—such as getting people to recycle more—beyond
188 Id. at 2–3.
189 See Council Directive 2011/83/EU, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64 [hereinafter
Directive on Consumer Rights]. The Directive has been applicable since June
2014. Id. at art. 28.
190 Id. at art. 22 (emphasis added).
191 RENÉ VAN BAVEL ET AL., JOINT RES. CTR., APPLYING BEHAVIOURAL
SCIENCES TO EU POLICY-MAKING 3 (2013) https://ec.europaeu/jrc/en/publication
/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/applying-behavioural-science-eu-
policy-making.
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preventing citizens from behaving against their own best
interest.192 It discusses adopting behavioral insights at three levels
of policy making: design, implementation, and monitoring.193
Behavioral insights can help design new policies, provide input for
improvements to existing ones, and provide ex post explanations of
why the policy’s targeted group reacted in a particular way.194 The
document also gives guidelines on how the different services of the
European Commission should commission behavioral studies.195
DG SANCO paved the way for the application of behavioral
economics to EU policymaking.196 Other DGs have followed
suit,197 including DG Competition,198 DG Information Society and
Media,199 DG Environment,200 DG Justice,201 and DG Internal
Market.202 The European Union also established its nudge unit, the
192 See id.
193 See id.
194 See id. at 6.
195 See id. at 13–19.
196 CIRIOLO, supra note 187, at 2.
197 Id. at 2–3.
198 Id. at 3. See generally Behavioural Economics, Competition and
Remedy Design (Revisited) OXERA (April 2015), http://www.oxera.com/Latest-
Thinking/Agenda/2015/Behavioural-economics,-competition-and-remedy-
desi.aspx (stating that DG Competition was a guest participant at a meeting to
discuss behavioral economics and policy).
199 CIRIOLO, supra note 187, at 2–3. See generally EUROPEAN COMM’N,
CONSUMER 2020: FROM DIGITAL AGENDA TO DIGITAL ACTION (2010) (stating
that DG Information Society was involved in the creation of a study using
behavioral economics).
200 CIRIOLO, supra note 187, at 3. See generally POLICY STUDIES
INSTITUTE, DESIGNING POLICY TO INFLUENCE CONSUMERS: CONSUMER
BEHAVIOUR RELATING TO THE PURCHASING OF ENVIRONMENTALLY
PREFERABLEGOODS 4 (2009).
201 See Directive on Consumer Rights, supra note 189.
202 See generally CIRIOLO, supra note 187; EUROPEAN COMM’N,
CONSUMER DECISION-MAKING IN RETAIL INVESTMENT SERVICES: A
BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 3 (November 2010),
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/financial_services/reference_studies_documents/d
ocs/consumer_decision-making_in_retail_investment_services_-_final_report_e
n.pdf (jointly conducted by DG Internal Market and Services and DG Health
and Consumers). For further Commission Consumer financial services,
Consumer Financial Services, EUROPEAN COMM’N,
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“Foresight and Behavioural Insights Unit” at the European
Commission’s in-house science and research service, the Joint
Research Centre (“JRC”), in order to coordinate efforts undertaken
by other DGs.203 However, the JRC has not yet sufficiently
integrated interdisciplinary learning theory, which would make
policy interventions more effective at the regulatee level and
encourage better regulation at the institutional level.204
The UK Behavioural Insights Team (“UK BIT”), the pioneer of
behavioral public policy in the European Union, has employed the
practice of institutional learning in its operations, especially in the
context of RCTs,205 and accumulated this knowledge in a
document entitled “Test, Learn, Adapt”206 which touts the
relevance of learning.207 UK BIT has identified three broad
categories that are required to set up any RCT:
Test: “Testing an intervention means that robust
measures have been put in place enabling the
evaluation of the effectiveness of the
intervention.”208
Learn: “Learning is about analyzing the outcome of
the intervention, so that “what works” can be
identified and whether or not the effect size is
sufficiently large to offer good value for money.”209
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/finservices-retail/investment_products/index_en.htm
(last visited July 12, 2017).
203 See LOURENCO ET AL., supra note 168, at 8; Alemanno & Sibony, supra
note 186, at 89.
204 Cf. OECD, BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 13,
at 43 (explaining how, for example, a lack of ex post evaluation of regulatory
interventions hurts effective policy implementation).
205 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 929 (2011) (arguing that RCTs should be used to inform regulatory
policy); see also RACHEL GLENNERSTER & KUDZAI TAKAVARASHA, RUNNING
RANDOMIZED EVALUATIONS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 191 (2014) (describing the
conduct of RCTs).
206 LAURAHAYNES ET AL., CABINETOFF. & BEHAV. INSIGHTS TEAM, TEST,
LEARN, ADAPT: DEVELOPING PUBLIC POLICY WITH RANDOMISED CONTROLLED
TRIALS 4–5 (2013).
207 Id. at 5, 30.
208 Id. at 7.
209 Id.
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Adapt: “Adapting means using learning to modify
the intervention if necessary, so that the way in
which the policy is designed and implemented is
continually refined.”210
This behavioral approach has already been adopted throughout
the European Union, most prominently by the French
government,211 the Dutch market supervision authority,212 and
some regulatory agencies including the UK Financial Conduct
Authority (“FCA”).213 The Better Regulation strategy of the
European Commission is bound to spur the impact of behavioral
insights on regulation, both at the regional and domestic levels.214
Indeed, a recent JRC report shows the increasing breadth and depth
of behaviorally informed regulation in many different member
states.215 However, as the following case studies show, learning is
still not adequately captured in regulatory reality.
D. Case Studies in Comparative Law
Behavioral regulation is thus strongly embedded in the
regulatory framework both in the United States and in the
European Union, with key documents from both jurisdictions
210 Id.




212 NETHERLANDS AUTH. FOR CONSUMERS AND MARKETS, BEHAVIOURAL
ECONOMICS ANDCOMPETITION POLICY 1 (2013), https://www.acm.nl/en/publicat
ions/publication/11610/ACM-publishes-study-into-behavioural-economics-and-
competition-policy/.
213 ERTA ET AL., supra note 168, at 11; FCA, ECONOMICS FOR EFFECTIVE
REGULATION, supra note 171, at 3.
214 Cf., e.g., RENÉ VAN BAVEL ET AL., supra note 191, at 3 (providing a
comprehensive overview of case studies in which behavioral insights were used
in the European Union); EUROPEAN COMM’N, BETTER REGULATIONGUIDELINES
5 (2015) (providing guidelines on regulatory planning, impact assessment,
monitoring and evaluation, inter alia, with a view to prompting effective
behavior change among regulatees), http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guideli
nes/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf.
215 LOURENCO ET AL., supra note 168, at 6.
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making clear references to learning.216 However, the way learning
should proceed is not fully theorized in these regulations. More
importantly, as the following case studies demonstrate, the
exhortations to integrate learning procedures into regulation are
often disregarded in practice, even in behaviorally guided
regulation.
1. Green Nudging
In recent years, important applications of behavioral insights to
regulation have been made in the environmental law context,
where green nudges217 are increasingly used to steer people toward
environment-friendly behavior or alternatives.218 By tapping the
resources of behavioral economics in designing disclosures,
choices, or default rules, green nudges can contribute toward
overcoming global collective action problems in which
individually optimal behavior does not lead to the social optimum
due to the possibility of free riding, such as combating climate
change.219 Green nudges usually take one of three different forms:
disclosures about product attributes, social comparison messages
about product use, or default rules.220 However, each of these
216 See supra Section II.C. (discussing Executive Orders in the United
States and regulations passed by the EU and its member states designed to
facilitate learning from behavioral insight).
217 Green nudges are a type of nudges that seek to promote environmentally
friendly (“green”) behavior, for example via disclosures, default rules, or
references to social norms; examples are provided in this section. See ERTA ET
AL., supra note 168, at 9 (explaining nudges as “small prompts that, if designed
well, have low costs and can lead to better decisions by biased consumers
without restricting choice”).
218 See Cass R. Sunstein & Lucia A. Reisch, Automatically Green:
Behavioral Economics and Environmental Protection, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
127, 128–30 (2014).
219 See generally Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational
Choice Theory of Collective Action, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1–3 (1998)
(discussing global collective action problems).
220 See infra Sections II.D.1.a–c; see also Philipp Hacker & Giorgos
Dimitropoulos, Behavioural Law & Economics and Sustainable Regulation, in
ENVIRONMENTAL. LAW AND ECONOMICS 155 (Klaus Mathis & Bruce R. Huber
eds., 2017).
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techniques fails to adequately consider the possibilities and
necessities of learning, as examples from both sides of the Atlantic
will show.
a. Disclosures about Product Attributes
The first set of green nudges uses disclosures to point
consumers to the effects different products such as cars or
household appliances may have on the environment.221 Here, the
problems from a learning perspective are twofold. First,
disclosures may contain an excessive amount of information,
leading to information overload.222 Second, even if appropriate
design avoids information overload, disclosures may have
unintended consequences that the regulatory agency must guard
against in order to evaluate and adapt regulation.223
Regarding the first concern, agencies have made efforts to
design disclosures in ways that are easy for consumers to
understand. For example, the environmental impact of some
products must be disclosed. Consider the U.S. Fuel Economy and
Environment label:224
221 Hacker & Dimitropoulos, supra note 220, at 164–167; Renate Schubert,
Purchasing Energy Efficient Appliances – To Incentivize or To Regulate?, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 215 (Klaus Mathis & Bruce R. Huber
eds., 2017).
222 See Eppler & Mengis, supra note 34, at 326; Edmunds & Morris, supra
note 34, at 18–19.
223 Cf. Schubert, supra note 221 (discussing a volume effect under which
disclosures of energy efficiency may lead to the purchase of more energy-
efficient, but larger appliances, with a negative total effect on energy
consumption).
224 Gasoline Vehicles: Learn More About the New Label, U.S. DEP’T. OF
ENERGY, https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/label/learn-more-gasoline-
label.shtml (last visited July 12, 2017).
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The disclosure’s twelve parameters and many subparameters225
may induce information overload, particularly for consumers
unfamiliar with its various abbreviations. Conversely, the
European Commission has commissioned a study to test different
disclosure formats in order to maximize the environmental impact
of fuel labels.226 The results demonstrate that formats highlighting
fuel economy—the running cost of cars—were more effective in
guiding consumers towards environmentally friendly cars than
formats focusing directly on emissions.227 The results further
highlight the importance of using specific metrics, in this case
monetary incentives, to motivate consumers to act in
environmentally friendly ways.228 This is consonant with learning
theory, which stresses the need for arousing the learner’s intrinsic
motivations to elicit a favorable response.229 Moreover, the
European study also contributes to institutional learning by giving
feedback on previous regulatory strategies and providing
225 Id.
226 CRISTIANO CODAGNONE ET AL., TESTING CO2/CAR LABELLINGOPTIONS
ANDCONSUMER INFORMATION 1 (2013), https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima
/files/transport/vehicles/labelling/docs/report_car_labelling_en.pdf.
227 Id. at 9.
228 Id. at 53.
229 See BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY, supra note 42, at 8.
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opportunities to adapt.230 Despite the study’s promising results, it
remains to be seen how future fuel labels will be affected.
Energy efficiency labels for household appliances require a
different set of disclosures relating to product use, and serve to
make consumers aware of environmentally friendly alternatives. In
the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)231
developed the mandatory EnergyGuide, which provides estimated
yearly operating costs.232 In the European Union, by contrast, the
Energy Efficiency Grade, which in the most popular one variation
grades energy efficiency from D to A+++, must accompany the sale
of many household appliances.233 An experimental study showed
that labels focusing on the monetary value of saving energy costs
are more effective in steering consumers toward energy efficient
appliances.234 Again, institutional learning could benefit from
integrating these results when designing novel energy efficiency
labels. However, learning is also about accounting for unintended
230 CODAGNONE ET AL., supra note 226, at 24–28, 86.
231 See PETER C. WARD, FED. TRADE COMM’N. LAW, PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 6-31, § 10-30 (2005); Abhijit Banerjee & Barry D. Solomon,
Eco-Labeling for Energy Efficiency and Sustainability: A Meta-Evaluation of
US Programs, 31 ENERGY POL’Y 109, 112 (2003) (both describing the central
role of the FTC in elaborating fuel economy labels).
232 Shopping for Home Appliances? Use the EnergyGuide Label, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 2015), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0072-
shopping-home-appliances-use-energyguide-label; see also Banerjee &
Solomon, supra note 231, at 111–12.
233 Directive 2010/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
19 May 2010 on the indication by labelling and standard product information of
the consumption of energy and other resources by energy-related products, 2010
O.J. (L 153/1); see also New EU En Energy Label, CONSEIL EUROPÉEN DE LA
CONSTRUCTION D’ELECTRO-DOMESTIQUES (CECED), http://www.newenergylab
el.com/index.php/uk/home/ (last visited July 12, 2017). The D–A+++ scale,
although popular, is certainly not the only method of labeling green energy
products. In fact, the European Commission in 2015 proposed a return to the A–
G label scale, arguing that a return to such a scale would help consumers more
readily identify the most energy-efficient products. See Energy Efficient
Products, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-
efficiency/energy-efficient-products (last visited July 12, 2017).
234 Richard G. Newell & Juha Siikamäki, Nudging Energy Efficiency
Behavior: The Role of Information Labels, 1 J. ASSC’N ENV. & RESOURCE
ECON. 555, 593 (2014).
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consequences of regulation. As a recent field experiment shows,
energy labels may induce a “volume effect,” which leads
consumers to buy more energy-efficient, but larger appliances,
which may result in greater net energy consumption.235 The best
practice may be to require such labels only within certain classes
of household appliances, defined by their absolute volume of
energy consumption, so consumers do not trade off greater energy
efficiency against greater net energy consumption.
All in all, the devil is in the detail when it comes to optimizing
labels to encourage environmentally friendly choices. On the one
hand, label addressees’ cognitive limitations and motivational
factors must be acknowledged for learning effects to even start. On
the other hand, institutional learning must be pursued to maximize
the effectiveness of the labels for addressees and to guard against
unintended consequences of disclosure.
b. Social Comparison Messages about Product
Use
Another popular strategy to induce environmentally friendly
behavior is the use of social comparison messages, which situate
the recipients within a reference group and inform them about the
prevailing choice of other members of this group.236 For example,
some energy providers in the United States include comparative
information about the average consumption of other households in
the area on the electricity or water bills; furthermore, the message
includes emoticons to indicate whether the recipient did “great,”
“good” or “below average.”237 Such treatments led to a reduction
of electricity consumption by about 2 percent238 and a decrease in
water consumption by about 4 percent.239 The messages,
importantly, make otherwise unobservable behavior by others
235 Schubert, supra note 221, at 215–234.
236 Hacker & Dimitropoulos, supra note 220, at 163–164.
237 Hunt Allcott, Social Norms and Energy Conservation, 95 J. PUBL.
ECON. 1082, 1083–84 (2011).
238 Id. at 1083.
239 Paul J. Ferraro & Michael K. Price, Using Nonpecuniary Strategies to
Influence Behavior: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment, 95 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 64, 68–69 (2013).
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available to the recipients, enabling learning by observation,
reinforced by social norms.
A closer look at the results of such messages point to their
ambivalent character from a learning perspective, however. On the
one hand, they do enable quasi-observational learning; on the other
hand, their effects decay over time.240 This points to a larger
problem with informational nudges relating to choices which are
repeated over time: the impermanence of their effects. While
disclosures on product attributes result in choosing a product
whose characteristics remain constant over time, messages about
product use intend to inform behavior that is subject to change
over time.241 Learning theory, however, points to the importance of
continuous, clear feedback in order to make behavior change
permanent.242 Therefore, from a learning perspective, it does not
come as a surprise that messages addressing product use lose their
effectiveness over time as the content of the most recent message
fades from memory.243 The upshot is that institutional learning
must not be based on the results of experimental studies which
only capture the effect of social comparison messages immediately
after their deployment; rather, continuous monitoring of their
performance, and continuous feedback to learners, are necessary to
ensure that the initial successes of reducing energy and water
consumption, for example, are made sustainable over time.244
c. Default Rules
Default rules can be powerful tools for changing outcomes due
to the status quo bias, which leads people to stick with
240 Id. at 70–71; Allcott, supra note 237, at 1087; Steffen Kallbekken et al.,
Bridging the Energy Efficiency Gap: A Field Experiment on Lifetime Energy
Costs and Household Appliances, 36 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 1, 10 (2013).
241 Alcott, supra note 237, at 1087; Ferraro & Price, supra note 239, at 70–
1; Kallbekken et al., supra note 240, at 10.
242 See Fischhoff, supra note 113, at 437.
243 See sources cited supra note 241.
244 OECD, BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 13, at
43 (“It is also important to continue monitoring policies over time to assess
whether the intervention causes a one-time effect or can enable habitual
change.”).
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predetermined options rather than changing them.245 These rules
were leveraged in several interventions on both sides of the
Atlantic to further green outcomes. At Rutgers University, for
example, the default was changed from simplex to duplex printing,
leading to a decrease in paper consumption by 44 percent.246 In
Germany, some communities chose to default citizens into a green,
rather than gray,247 energy provider.248 Hence, the green option
became a default that people had to actively opt out of, instead of
being required to opt in to green energy. In the green default
scenario, the stickiness of the default rule led to a majority staying
with the green energy provider, an option chosen only rarely when
it was not the default.249 However, these results are unsatisfactory
from a learning perspective as actors “choose” the green option
only passively, hence mostly out of ignorance, inertia,
procrastination or lack of interest.250 Therefore, the outcome
desired by regulation (e.g., increased green behavior) is strictly
limited to scenarios in which the default rule is applied. Learning
245 See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in
Decision Making, 1 J. RISK&UNCERTAINTY 7, 33, 41 (1988).
246 Sunstein & Reisch, supra note 218, at 133.
247 A green energy provider predominantly uses energy from renewable
sources, while a gray provider uses traditional sources, such as coal, gas or
nuclear energy, that tend to cause more environmental pollution or related
environmental problems. See id. at 128, 134–36.
248 See generally Felix Ebeling & Sebastian Lotz, Domestic Uptake of
Green Energy Promoted by Opt-out Tariffs, 5 NATURECLIM. CHANGE 868, 868–
71 (2015) (discussing the results of a controlled trial in Germany which found
that “[s]etting the default choice to more expensive ‘green’ energy . . . increased
purchases of such nearly tenfold”); Daniel Pichert & Konstantinos V.
Katsikopoulos, Green Defaults Information Presentation and Pro-
Environmental Behaviour, 28 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 63 (2008) (discussing the
results of natural studies and laboratory experiments supporting the hypothesis
that people are more prone to use the type of electricity that is designated as the
default).
249 Ebeling & Lotz, supra note 248, 868–71; Pichert & Katsikopoulos,
supra note 248, at 66–70; see also Sebastian Berger, The Power of the Nudge to
Change our Energy Future, SCI. AM. (December 29, 2015),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-power-of-the-nudge-to-change-
our-energy-future/.
250 Cf. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 245, at 10 (discussing, inter
alia, convenience, habit and inertia as causes of default effects).
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presupposes awareness, which is often lacking when mere default
rules are employed to change outcomes.
This survey has shown that green nudging can make a
meaningful contribution to the solution of global collective action
problems.251 However, from a learning perspective, all techniques
need to be improved to make learning effective and lasting, at both
the regulator and regulatee level. Eventually, putting learning
center stage will be necessary for the reviewed techniques to
unfold their full potential in the fight against climate change.
However, “green” nudges are not the only regulatory tools
available to policy makers that may bring about beneficial
behavioral change in regulatees.
2. Consumer Disclosures
There are significant differences concerning the focus on
learning in consumer disclosures on both sides of the Atlantic.
While the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”)252 conducted serious empirical studies to make
disclosures understandable and maximize learning outcomes for
consumers, the recent EU Consumer Rights Directive prescribes a
staggering amount of information for consumer disclosures which
are likely to provoke information overload and hinder, rather than
facilitate, learning.
a. CFPB: Mortgage Disclosures
In the wake of the 2007 financial crisis, President Obama
created the CFPB253 following strong academic
recommendations.254 One of the first tasks the CFPB took on was
251 Cf. Berger, supra note 249 (discussing “default options” and a German
study which concluded that setting the default to green energy, increases
consumer participation). For global collective action problems, see Ostrom,
supra note 219.
252 See sources cited supra note 171 and accompanying text.
253 Formally, the CFPB was set up by the Dodd-Frank Act. See sources
cited, supra note 171.
254 Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 98 (2008); see also the critical discussion in Joshua D. Wright, The
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the revision of mandatory disclosures accompanying mortgage
loans.255 The desire to find new solutions for informing consumers
when making mortgage decisions was spurred by two
observations.256 First, subprime mortgages were at the center of the
financial crisis that started in 2007.257 Second, a study showed that
in 2009 the vast majority of borrowers choosing a mortgage
backed loan took less than one minute to peruse the complex
disclosures they were given.258 The CFPB therefore engaged in an
unprecedented series of rigorous testing of new disclosure formats
and designs that would motivate people to read and understand
them.259 Following up on a 2007 study by the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”),260 a team of empirical scientists at the CFPB
conducted several rounds of testing using one hundred different
formats.261 Those were repeatedly used and adapted in an iterative
procedure involving consumer and industry representative groups
from various regions and demographic backgrounds in the United
Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with Each Other,
121 YALE L. J. 2216, 2220–21 (2012) (noting that “[b]ehavioral law and
economics, as advocated by Professors Bar-Gill and Warren in an article laying
out the blueprint for a new agency, played a significant role in the creation of the
CFPB.”).
255 KLEIMANN COMMC’NGRP., INC., supra note 171, at xi.
256 Id. at 25.
257 Cf, e.g., Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis and the
Disclosure Paradigm in European Financial Regulation: The Case for Reform,
4 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 440, 444 (2009) (discussing the failure of
disclosures in preventing the financial crisis). On the case for global economic
reform after the crisis, see, e.g., WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER ET AL.,
FAIRECONOMY: CRISES, CULTURE, COMPETITION AND THE ROLE OF LAW 1
(2013) (discussing the case for global economic reform after the crisis).
258 Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer
Protection Law or How the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime
Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L. J. 761, 783–84 (2010).
259 KLEIMANN COMMC’NGRP., INC., supra note 171, at xxiii.
260 JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT




261 KLEIMANN COMMC’NGRP., INC, supra note 171, at xxiii.
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States.262 After one and a half years, the team produced the
disclosure format that combined a multilayered approach, featuring
multiple layers of increasing complexity, with a standardized table
design for better comparison.263 The same approach was later
employed to improve disclosures for prepaid payment cards.264
This strategy epitomizes fruitful feedback loops that are crafted
into rule generation. Disclosures are meant to help consumers learn
about the options they have and the choices they make.265 Indeed, a
key finding of the CFPB’s study was that, equipped with the right
forms of disclosure, consumers were making intricate trade-offs
and calculations.266 The desire to continuously improve upon those
individual learning results, however, led to significant empirical
performance testing and qualitative interviews to find two final
designs for disclosure forms.267 Those two components—
individual and institutional learning—are of paramount importance
for systemic learning. Taking the insights from the study one step
further, one could make use of the findings to more generally and
critically review the legal mandates upon which the disclosures
and their formats are based. For example, empirical pretesting
could be mandated for a large range of legal interventions,
262 Id.
263 On the effectiveness of standardized table formats, see Patrick Gage
Kelley et al., Standardizing Privacy Notices: An Online Study of the Nutrition
Label Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ONHUMAN FACTORS INCOMPUTING SYSTEMS 1573 (2010).
264 Eric Goldberg, Prepaid Products: New Disclosures to Help You
Compare Options (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/prepa
id-products-new-disclosures-to-help-you-compare-options/; CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION BUREAU, MODEL FORM FOR SHORT FORM DISCLOSURES FOR
GOVERNMENT BENEFITACCOUNTS (2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/20
1411_cfpb_prepaid-model-sample-disclosure-forms.pdf.
265 Sunstein Memorandum, supra note 169, at 8 (“. . . [T]he best method for
informing consumers at the point of decision. Full disclosure is the best method
of allowing groups and individuals access to a broad range of information,
allowing them to analyze and disseminate that information in creative ways, and
to use it to inform private and public decisions or otherwise to promote statutory
goals”).
266 KLEIMANN COMMC’NGRP., INC, supra note 171, at xxiv.
267 Id. at xxiii.
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establishing a routine of systemic learning in the legal system.268
The CFPB’s study is thus one example of positive regulatory
action intended to improve learning.
b. EU Consumer Information after the
Consumer Rights Directive
In stark contrast to the CFPB proceedings, the recent enactment
of the EU Consumer Rights Directive269 is a prime example of
information overload. It shows an unconstrained belief in almost
infinite information processing and learning capabilities of
consumers and a patent disregard for cognitive capacity limits.270
In its Article 6, for example, the Directive lists over twenty items,
many with various subitems, that must be disclosed to consumers
in online sales.271 The list is slightly shorter for general consumer
contracts (Article 5), but still long enough to likely provoke
information overload for anyone trying to process all the
information before signing a contract.272 This already shows a
substantial difference to the TILA-RESPA disclosures which were
designed specifically to avoid information overload.273 More
importantly, on a procedural level, before passing the Consumer
Rights Directive the European Commission made no efforts to
assess the effect of substantial and dense disclosures on consumers,
to test alternative formats, or to improve learning outcomes for the
millions of recipients of such disclosures.274
268 See infra Section III.B.
269 Directive on Consumer Rights, supra note 189.
270 Cf. Vanessa Mak, Standards of Protection: In Search of the “Average
Consumer” of EU Law in the Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive, 19
EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 25, 28 (2011) (discussing the cognitive assumptions of
the consumer type inherent in the Directive on Consumer Rights).
271 Directive on Consumer Rights, supra note 189, at art. 6.
272 Hacker, The Behavioral Divide, supra note 168, at 313. PHILIPP
HACKER, VERHALTENSÖKONOMIK UND NORMATIVITÄT. DIE GRENZEN DES
INFORMATIONSMODELLS IM PRIVATRECHT UND SEINE ALTERNATIVEN
[Behavioral Economics and Normativity. The Limits of the Disclosure Paradigm
in Private Law and Its Alternatives] (2017), under § 13 B.II.1.b).
273 See supra Section II.D.2.a.
274 Elizabeth Hall et al., The Consumer Rights Directive – An Assessment of
its Contribution to the Development of European Consumer Contract Law, 8
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While the revision of the mortgage disclosures by the CFPB
may be viewed as a successful integration of learning-oriented
regulatory processes, the revision of consumer disclosures in the
European Union, which ironically are meant to strengthen
consumer rights, illustrates the still rampant neglect of the
importance of learning in many parts of the law. In sum, the case
studies have shown that a focus on institutional learning through
pretesting of proposed rules and formats may lead to substantial
increases in the effectiveness of regulatory policies, such as the
development of novel disclosures.275 Conversely, failure to do so
may create missed opportunities for institutional learning within a
regulatory agency and lead to ineffective policy implementations.
The disregard of learning leads to disclosures that are prone to
provoke information overload instead of helping consumers
choose;276 to green nudges that are impermanent and merely
temporary derive environmental benefits;277 and to default rules
that govern through the harnessing of inertia rather than through
stimulating conscious choice and learning.278
E. Lessons from the International and Comparative
Perspective
Since behavioral scholarship puts a premium on the real effects
of regulation, legal regimes that strive to improve the effectiveness
of regulatory interventions should adopt new learning methods to
bring about lasting and beneficial behavioral change in the law at
different levels. Such a theory can contribute both to the methods
and the substance of behavioral law and economics.
Although international and domestic regulatory agencies
increasingly take behavioral findings into account when adopting
policies, there are still exceptions to this trend, as identified in the
European Consumer Rights Directive and its excessive disclosure
EUR. REV. CONT. L. 139, 141 (2012) (arguing that the Commission failed to
draw more substantially on behavioral economics when crafting the directive).
275 See supra Section II.D.2.a.
276 See supra Sections II.D.1.a, II.D.2.b.
277 See supra Section II.D.1.b.
278 See supra Section II.D.1.c.
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requirements.279 Even behaviorally informed regulation, however,
remains often unsatisfactory from a learning perspective.
Disclosures are often overly complex, leading to information
overload; direct messages concerning product use have
impermanent effects over time; and default rules neglect learning
processes altogether.280 In some instances, rigorous pretesting of
regulatory proposals can lead to enhanced learning outcomes for
addressees and institutional learning procedures within regulatory
agencies.281 However, these cases are the exception rather than the
rule.
III. OVERARCHING LESSONS: LEARNING TOOLS FOR
INTERNATIONAL ANDDOMESTIC BEHAVIORAL REGULATION
The preceding sections discussed case studies that highlighted
how the absence of learning theory and practice leads to
suboptimal regulatory outcomes. The remainder of the Article
presents strategies to counter this by incorporating learning theory
into regulatory processes. Integrating the interdisciplinary findings
from learning theory into legal processes necessitates answering
two questions. First, who should learn? And second, how can
learning be achieved in institutional settings, both at the
international and national level? In this final part of the Article, we
take these questions up in turn. Our aim is to specifically show
how behavioral law and economics and behavioral regulation can
be informed by the different learning theories described in Part I to
develop smarter, more scientific, and more effective regulation,
both at the international and domestic level.
A. Who Should Learn? Uniting Individual, Social and
Institutional Learning
In current behavioral law and economics literature, too much
focus is placed on individual learning to the detriment of
279 See supra Section II.D.2.b.
280 See supra Sections II.D.1, II.D.2.b.
281 See the discussion of the design of TILA-RESPA disclosures by the
CFPB, supra Section II.D.2.a.
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institutional learning and the interrelated processes between
individuals and institutions. There are four types of learning that
need be considered for a coherent approach to learning: individual,
institutional, group, and systemic. Individual learning is neatly
described by psychology and economics.282 Institutional learning
draws primarily on the literature from organization science. Group
learning occupies an intermediate level between the individual and
the institution or the individual and society at large; it features
prominently both in social psychology and in organizational
science.283 Finally, all these different learning approaches can be
integrated and reinforced in a holistic perspective: systemic
learning.
In this section, we first advance some proposals for an
enhancement of institutional learning. Second, we elaborate on the
integration of institutional and individual processes into what may
be dubbed systemic learning. Thus, we explore the two dimensions
that have been neglected most so far.
1. Institutional Learning
Because of the path dependence of behavioral law and
economics on traditional law and economics, institutional learning
has been largely disregarded in this newer field of research. Still,
institutions play an important role both for traditional and
behavioral law and economics, given that they create the
conditions based on which regulatory decisions are made at the
micro- and macro-level of government decision making.
According to the “knowledge problem” developed by Hayek,
governments might introduce substantively erroneous regulation
simply because they lack sufficient information.284 This can be
mitigated by developing forms of institutional learning through
which government can learn. If institutions develop learning
capabilities, this will also cut against the story of “behavioral
bureaucrats,” which is often advanced as an argument against
282 See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
283 See supra Sections I.A.2, I.B.2.
284 See von Hayek, supra note 99, at 520–21.
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behavioral law and economics.285 Furthermore, if regulators
improve their own learning capabilities, they will then be in a
better position to improve social learning. Different theories
stemming primarily from management and social psychology have
developed the idea that organizations have the ability to develop
and learn.286
Similarly, theories of democratic experimentalism propose new
ways of government regulation. Learning plays a central role in
“experimentalist governance” or “new governance” theories.287
Experimentalist governance creates a regulatory environment that
is equipped to escape both the hierarchical imposition of rules and
285 See Jolls et al., supra note 3, at 1543–46; see generally Perez, supra
note 116, at 121–123 (discussing evidence of biases affecting experts, such as
regulators).
286 See supra Section I.B.2.
287 See generally Gráinne de Búrca, New Governance and
Experimentalism: An Introduction, WIS. L. REV. 227 (2010) (explaining the
similarities and differences between New Governance and experimentalist
theories) [hereinafter de Búrca, New Governance and Experimentalism];
Charles Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalist Governance, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012) (explaining
experimentalist governance) [hereinafter Sabel & Zeitlin, Experimentalist
Governance]. Experimentalist structures are proliferating at the domestic level,
see, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and
Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011) (analyzing
examples of experimental governance at the domestic level), the regional level,
see Gráinne de Búrca, The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the
European Union, 28 EUR. L. REV. 814 (2003) (analyzing examples of
experimental governance at the regional level) [hereinafter de Búrca, The
Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the EU]; Charles F. Sabel &
Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of
Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUR. L. J. 271 (2008) (analyzing the
EU Open Method of Coordination, which is a very commonly used example of
experimentalist governance) [hereinafter Sabel & Zeitlin, Learning from
Difference], and the international level, see Gráinne de Búrca et al., New Modes
of Pluralist Global Governance, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 723, 739 (2013)
[hereinafter de Búrca et al., New Modes of Pluralist Global Governance];
Gráinne de Búrca et al., Global Experimentalist Governance, 44 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 477 (2014) [hereinafter de Búrca et al., Global Experimentalist
Governance] of governance. Strategic uncertainty is the basic background
precondition of experimentalism. See William H. Simon, New Governance
Anxieties: A Deweyan Response, WIS. L. REV. 727, 728-30 (2010).
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the creation of disputes among the involved parties. This is
achieved through a collaborative approach adopted at both the
rulemaking and the implementation stages that accommodates the
diversity of the participating actors.288 Participatory goal-setting,
decentralized implementation, information gathering, performance
monitoring, peer review, consultations, and deliberative
comparison of experience are central characteristics of
experimentalist regimes, and are all forms of institutional learning.
Governance by experiment proceeds in four steps:289 1) the
involved actors collectively set framework goals like better
government performance, good political governance, or improving
efficiency; 2) the goals are further elaborated and implemented by
local actors who may be private actors such as companies or
territorial authorities; 3) the decentralized actors provide
information and data including feedback on the implementation of
the framework goals in return for autonomy of local
implementation;290 and 4) the relevant actors periodically and
reflexively revise goals in light of the knowledge gained.291
However, learning is not only important at the institutional level;
rather, improved institutional processes should lead to more
effective learning at the regulatee level. This is where systemic
learning comes in.
288 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 287, at 88–89 (discussing the
advantages to experimentalism in the context of regulation).
289 Id. at 79; see also de Búrca et al., New Modes of Pluralist Global
Governance, supra note 287, at 739; see also de Búrca et al., Global
Experimentalist Governance, supra note 292, at 483–85 (mentioning five
identifying features of experimentalist governance: inclusive stakeholder
participation in a non-hierarchical process; articulation of agreed common
problems, and establishment of a framework understanding, setting open-ended
goals; devolution to lower level or local actors with contextualized knowledge,
and implementation of the framework goals by them; continuous feedback,
reporting, and monitoring; established practices, usually involving peer review,
for revision of rules and practices).
290 The production of the data is usually based on instruments of
quantification of the implementation results, like indicators. See HAYNES ET AL.,
supra note 209, at 30–31; see also infra Section III.B.1, (describing feedback
loops). Monitoring of this type usually takes the form of a peer review of the
decentralized units. Sabel & Simon, supra note 287, at 79–80.
291 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 287, at 79–80.
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2. Systemic Learning
Professors Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein argue that
behavioral interventions ought to increase either personal welfare,
as judged by each individual’s own preferences,292 or social
welfare.293 Despite partially substituting efficiency with choice
preservation, behavioral law and economics has so far exhibited
strong path dependence on classical law and economics in several
respects.294 Even though improving regulation is a key objective,
behavioral scholars have not systematically considered ways to
improve regulatory intervention in case of market, government, or
behavioral failure after the introduction of the behavioral
intervention, namely the ability of government to learn through the
nudging process and adapt to citizens’ needs. The regulatory
techniques of behavioral law and economics—following again the
paths of traditional law and economics—have placed little
emphasis on learning. Even in cases where learning is considered,
it is following in the footsteps of law and economics by focusing
on social learning.295 Academics often disregard the supposed
major contribution of a behavioral intervention, namely whether
the debiasing or nudging effect can be ultimately achieved in the
long run,296 and what the exact contribution of the intervention is
in the debiasing process. Even though the nudging literature
focuses on the appropriate responses of government to individual
biases, it patently disregards learning by the institutions that have
initiated behavioral intervention.297 Conversely, the literature on
institutional learning does not consider debiasing; it only
acknowledges input by various actors—NGOs, businesses,
implementing authorities—disregarding whether the forecasted
output has been achieved. Regulatory practice in some fields is
more advanced than scholarship:298 some agencies do put a
292 Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism, supra note 103, at 1161–
62.
293 See Sunstein, supra note 104.
294 See Dimitropoulos, From Choosing to Learning, supra note 6, at 339.
295 See supra Section I.C.1.
296 See sources cited supra note 256 and accompanying text.
297 See supra Section I.B.2.
298 See supra Sections II.C.-D.
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premium on learning, but scholarship has not taken this up
sufficiently. Furthermore, the interdependence of individual and
institutional learning is neglected both by agencies and
scholarship.
Taking the two approaches together, behavioral law and
economics and behavioral regulation must consider learning at
both social and institutional levels: first, whether the debiasing or
learning outcome has been achieved, particularly in the long run,
among the members of society; and secondly, whether the
government has learned and improved its performance using input
from society. For these reasons, institutional mechanisms must be
implemented to help governments learn from the success and
failure of any behavioral intervention in society. This integration of
social and institutional learning produces a third category of
learning: systemic learning.
Systemic learning is a case of a whole that produces more than
the sum of its parts. It is the result of multiple interactions of
market participants and the government, and has four main
elements: horizontality, recursivity, spill-over effects, and future-
orientation. First, the primary learning effect is at the individual
level, namely at the level of the individual who has been debiased;
but learning is also achieved horizontally for other individuals and
society as a whole by learning through an exchange of views and
experiences, successes and failures, and observation and action.299
Second, systemic learning involves institutional learning that
integrates on-the-ground experiences in the implementation of
regulation. In order to achieve systemic learning, social and
institutional learning cannot be one-off events. Systemic learning
is a continuous process that involves several learning cycles over
time. As soon as one cycle ends, systemic learning demands that
government institutions prepare, improve, and increase efforts so
that they present better results for the next review cycle.
Regulation is thus informed by the results of experiential, social,
and institutional learning.
Third, systemic learning has a further spill-over component. It
gathers societal and institutional knowledge, success, failure, and
best practices from one sector, which is then diffused to other
299 See sources cited supra notes 36–49 and accompanying text.
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fields, very much in the vein of the learning society imagined by
Stiglitz and Greenwald.300 For systemic learning to be achieved,
for instance, the lessons of consumer law must be transposed and
adapted to competition law, from competition law to energy law,
from energy law to environmental law, and so on. This is one
component of learning that has been considered neither by the
relevant scholarship, nor the learning practice that has started being
developed by public authorities.
Finally, systemic learning involves learning from experience
and learning by doing, but goes one step further by giving private
actors and public institutions the capabilities to improve in the
future. Systemic learning is not only recursive, as institutional
learning is, but also generative: it engenders novel methods of
implementation and evaluation, facilitates the revision of
regulatory goals, and enhances an understanding of the behavioral
effects on regulatees as the central yardstick of the effectiveness of
policy interventions.301
B. How Should We Learn? Concrete Policy Proposals
In all observed theories, learning is perceived as a process,
rather than an output.302 In the final section of this Article, we thus
review different legal methods and institutional mechanisms than
can be employed to facilitate a continuous systemic learning
process: feedback loops, institutionalized systemic learning
facilities, and finally a proposal for an Agency for Systemic
Learning Management.
300 See STIGLITZ&GREENWALD supra note 1, at 170–80.
301 Cf. Michael Stolleis, Der lernfähige und lernende Staat, in
Wissenskulturen: Über die Erzeugung und Weitergabe von Wissen [The State
that is Capable of Learning and Does Learn, in Cultures of Knowledge: On the
Generation and Dissemination of Knowledge] 58, 64–65 (Johannes Fried &
Michael Stolleis eds., 2009) (differentiating between “traditional knowledge”
and “innovation knowledge”).
302 See, e.g., Levitt & March, supra note 79, at 333 (discussing forms and
limitations of learning processes in organizations); STIGLITZ & GREENWALD,
supra note 1 (arguing that learning processes should be put center stage on a
societal level).
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1. Feedback Loops
Going beyond simple disclosure, it seems crucial to implement
feedback loops at the individual and institutional levels.303
Feedback loops are an important tool of ex post evaluation in our
systemic learning regime: the institution implementing a regulatory
strategy is confronted with the results, and effectiveness, of the
intervention and feeds these insights back into an updated version
of the original strategy, creating recursivity at both the individual
and the institutional level. Studies from psychology and behavioral
economics tell us that learning does not occur on its own; rather, a
crucial factor in any learning process is clear and steady
feedback.304 In systemic learning, this insight cuts both ways. On
the one hand, individual actors need feedback on their decisions to
internalize and improve their performance. Individualized
feedback has, for example, been shown to reduce framing effects,
representativeness, and ambiguity aversion in future tasks.305 On
the other hand, institutions also must be provided with feedback in
order to adapt their strategies and structures. This holds
particularly true for regulatory agencies concerned with improving
the effect of their regulatory policies.306
303 Cf. Chris Argyris, Double Loop Learning in Organizations, HARV. BUS.
REV. 115 (Sept.-Oct. 1977) (stressing the importance of feedback loops for
learning in organizations); see generally FEEDBACK FOR LEARNING 1 (Susan
Askew ed., 2000) (collecting contributions on the importance of feedback for
learning).
304 See sources cited supra notes 113–118 and accompanying text.
305 Gokul Bhandari et al., Debiasing Investors with Decision Support
Systems: An Experimental Investigation, 46 DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 399,
406–7 (2008); see also Gokul Bhandari & Khaled Hassanein, An Agent-Based
Debiasing Framework for Investment Decision-Support Systems, 31 BEHAV. &
INFO. TECH. 495 (2012) (presenting an overview of the use of feedback-driven
decision support systems to overcome bias); Soyer & Hogarth, supra note 1, at
49 (describing the importance of feedback for learning).
306 See, e.g., Claire A. Dunlop & Claudio M. Radaelli, Overcoming
Illusions of Control: How to Nudge and Teach Regulatory Humility, in NUDGE
AND THE LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 139, 151 (Alberto Alemanno &
Anne-Lise Sibony eds., 2015) (arguing for ex post evaluation of regulatory
policies).
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Taken together, this provides for a double learning necessity:
individuals need to learn, and institutions need to assess whether
the individual learning facilitated by their policies is effective.307
This generates a recursive feedback process: regulatory policies
must be continually updated in order to enhance the individual
learning effects they aim to generate.308 Thus, institutional and
individual learning are interlocked in a framework of systemic
learning.309 But systemic learning still has work to do. What is
crucial in these strategies is the permanence of the learning effect
over time, yet there is little empirical evidence of the dynamic side
of debiasing interventions and the sustainability of debiasing
effects.310 Here, future research will need to invest time and effort
into determining those strategies that yield not only short-term
results but also long-term benefits. A systematic feedback loop
strategy, as envisaged here, is a worthwhile starting point for such
an endeavor.
The time is ripe for a greater focus on learning: the European
Commission has recognized the need for effective ex post
evaluation of policy in its attempt to provide for “Smart
Regulation;”311 the same strategies feature prominently in the
Better Regulation Guidelines published in May 2015.312 Greater
307 See, e.g., Fabiana Di Porto & Nicoletta Rangone, Behavioural Sciences
in Practice: Lessons for EU Policymakers, in NUDGE AND THE LAW: A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 29, 30–35 (Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony
eds., 2015) (stressing the value of monitoring in behaviorally-informed
regulation).
308 Cf. OECD, BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 13
(highlighting the importance of ex post evaluation for regulatory effectiveness).
309 The development of the mortgage and loan disclosures by the CFPB
visited above provide vivid examples of incipient systemic learning strategies.
See supra Section II.D.2.
310 Scott O. Lilienfeld et al., Giving Debiasing Away. Can Psychological
Research on Correcting Cognitive Errors Promote Human Welfare?, 4 PERSP.
PSYCHOL. SCI. 390, 395 (2009); Hacker & Dimitropoulos, supra note 220, at
174–77; see also supra, Section II.D.1.b.
311 EUROPEAN COMM’N, STRENGTHENING THE FOUNDATIONS OF SMART
REGULATION—IMPROVING EVALUATION 2 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/docs/com_2013_686_en.pdf .
312 See EUROPEAN COMM’N, BETTER REGULATION GUIDELINES, supra note
214, at 3, 48.
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policy evaluation also stands at the core of recent OECD
publications.313 Feedback loops and systemic learning processes
more broadly are crucial for this new endeavor of enhancing
regulatory effectiveness.
2. Institutionalized Systemic Learning Facilities
To facilitate systemic learning, regulatory agencies should
implement some form of structured review, feedback, and
continuous learning processes. Ideally, a specific part of every
organization—a systemic learning task force—should be tasked
with establishing, implementing, developing, and controlling the
use of systemic learning strategies within an institution. We call
these distinct operational units “institutionalized systemic learning
facilities,” designated and equipped with the necessary resources to
establish coherent learning procedures. These task forces could
thus play the role of both debiasing other bodies and members of
the institution and of providing a platform for continuous learning
approaches. In this way, existing institutions based on more
traditional regulatory approaches could be gradually transformed
into learning facilities by introducing simple modifications in their
institutional setup. Institutionalizing cognitively optimized
systemic learning facilities, for example in the form of feedback
loops and systemic learning task forces, would most likely
significantly enhance institutional learning capabilities for several
reasons. First, institutionalized learning facilities give frequent and
continuous feedback over a longer period, which is crucial for
learning to occur.314 Second, institutionalized learning facilities
structure tasks in an organized manner, thus making it less likely
for actors to feel overburdened and overloaded; the danger of
information overload315 can thus be mitigated. Third, if a systemic
learning task force professionally develops and implements
313 OECD, BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 13, at




314 See sources cited supra notes 113–118 and accompanying text.
315 See Baddeley, supra note 25, at 7; Bettman, supra note 24, at 9.
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routines for systemic learning, this group can act as a role model
for other parts of the institution. Observational learning and
learning by imitation, as discussed in the social cognition and
game theoretic literature,316 can be used to leverage the intra-
institutional diffusion of learning strategies. Fourth, using
management theory, a systemic learning task force can be charged
with the crucial task of developing new goals for the institution.
Management theory tells us that steady evaluation of goals, and the
creation of an atmosphere in which such critique is permitted and
even fostered, is a precondition for generative learning, the
effective production of knowledge.317 In this way, the task force
can make use of organizational theory to shape and change the
organization according to a learning paradigm. Fifth, such a
specialized task force would be made up of a team with diverse
social science backgrounds, from economics to psychology to law,
to take note of the most recent developments in the learning
literature and to implement the most effective strategies to
facilitate individual learning by citizens, consumers, clients, and
customers. Finally, since social planners are not immune to making
errors or exhibiting biases,318 the existence of learning institutions
may also help them identify and overcome their own possible
biases. Institutionalized learning facilities thus have an important
role to play in condensing the wisdom of learning theory into
strategies that can be implemented at the institutional level.
3. Agency for Systemic Learning Management
Finally, we recommend the establishment of an Agency for
Systemic Learning Management (“ASLM”) to better coordinate
efforts within government agencies and private institutions to
implement systemic learning facilities. In the United States, the
ASLM would best be created at the federal level, and thus could
potentially be integrated into OIRA.319 In the European Union, the
316 See sources cited supra, notes 38–41, 70–72 and accompanying text.
317 See SENGE, THE FIFTHDISCIPLINE, supra note 85, at 14, 233–70.
318 Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
133, 136 (2006).
319 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1349, 1388–89 (2011) (discussing how OIRA shaped regulatory processes,
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current tendency to review policy as part of the European
Commission’s better regulation initiative could be leveraged to
affiliate the ASLM with the Regulatory Fitness and Performance
(“REFIT”)320 platform that was established in May 2015 to
facilitate and coordinate efforts to reduce regulatory burden and to
enhance the content of regulation in all areas of EU policy.321
On both sides of the Atlantic, the agency would serve a dual
role. First, it would advise and control government agencies in
their efforts to install continuous learning facilities within their
institutions. It would be entrusted with the task of creating spill-
over effects across various regulatory policies and many regulatory
fields. Thus, it would help to spread learning effects across and
between institutions. For example, a policy that has worked in
some areas, such as cognitive optimization of the portrayal of
energy efficiency using monetary metrics,322 could be
communicated to regulatory bodies faced with similar problems in
different fields. This does not relieve the agencies from testing
whether the strategies can actually be transposed from one area to
another, but it would provide important cues that can generate
interinstitutional learning.
Second, the ASLM would develop best practices to be
distributed among private institutions for dealing with systemic
learning in private settings, where learning does not likewise occur
automatically.323 The ASLM could therefore issue two types of
recommendations to private actors. First, it should advise
companies on how to implement learning facilities within their
organizations. In doing so, the ASLM could draw on the multitude
particularly with a view to simplification and the integration of behavioral
insights into rulemaking).
320 See EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMMISSION DECISION OF 19.5.2015




322 See CODAGNONE ET AL., supra note 226, at 9, 53 and accompanying
text.
323 See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer
Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON.
505, 521 (2006).
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of experiences from institutionalized systemic learning facilities in
regulatory agencies. Additionally, it should encourage companies
to pursue strategies that might educate customers in a meaningful
way in the long-term by, for example, cognitively optimizing
disclosures. This can be particularly helpful with small- and
medium-sized enterprises that lack the resources to thoroughly
research and implement learning strategies on their own.
All in all, the ASLM should coordinate and instigate the
diffusion of learning strategies in both the public and the private
sector, bundling knowledge and resources, and thus correcting for
institutional and market failures alike. Organizational Behavioral
Insights Teams, or Nudge Units, have started playing a similar role
worldwide,324 and they could eventually be affiliated with or even
transformed into the envisaged ASLMs.
Moreover, the diffusion of learning across borders is important
for many different reasons, not least of which because the
relatively new connections to behavioral law and economics and
public policy are a young field of research and policy making.
There are at least five uncertainties connected to behaviorally
inspired policy making:325 uncertainty about the external validity
of experiments; uncertainty about the existence of biases;
uncertainty about the extent of biases; uncertainty about the
effectiveness of regulatory tools; and context effects.326 The road
towards greater certainty will need to be covered by real-life
application of behavioral policies. This Article proposes ways in
how to deal with the uncertainties beyond the mere conduct of
research and using the learning experience of behavioral policy
makers.
Learning about the impact of economic policies has been dealt
with in the policy learning literature that seeks to understand the
processes by which policy makers change their beliefs as a result
of observing and interpreting their experiences, and the eventual
324 See HACKER, supra note 272, at 1–2 (describing the rise of nudge units
in different countries); Philipp Hacker, More Behavioral vs. More Economic
Approach, supra note 186, at 366–68 (describing nudge units in the EU and in
the Obama administration); supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text.
325 See also LUNN, supra note 4, at 52–55.
326 See id. at 51–62.
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corresponding policy changes.327 The most prominent learning
model in the existing literature is Bayesian updating, namely that
governments learn about policies by weighing prior beliefs against
the quantity and quality of observed experience.328 Lately, political
science and international relations theories inspired by behavioral
insights have introduced new insights to the Bayesian learning
model of policy diffusion.329
Given the global spread of behavioral public policy and nudge
units, it becomes important to facilitate this process beyond
informal meetings in an effort to avoid bounded learning in policy
diffusion. As in other fields of public policy, an organization at the
international level of governance, such as the OECD, should play
an important role in the structured diffusion of knowledge on
behavioral public policy.330 The first step should be the formation
of a transnational network of nudge units, where nudge units could
meet and exchange their views and experiences from the
application of behavioral insights into policymaking.331 Another
step could be undertaken towards further institutionalization with
the creation of an international ASLM, a “meta-nudge unit,” with
an office within an international organization such as the United
Nations.332 The role of such an office would be as a continuous
327 Levy, supra note 22, at 279–84.
328 See Poulsen & Aisbett, supra note 61, at 274, n. 4 (defining ‘quality’ as
“the variability, or consistency, of available outcome information”).
329 See id.; KURT WEYLAND, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND POLICY
DIFFUSION: SOCIAL SECTOR REFORM IN LATINAMERICA 34–6 (2006).
330 See OECD, BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note
13, at 4.
331 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 4 (2004) (proposing
international governance for global policymaking); Kal Raustiala, The
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and
the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (discussing benefits of
transgovernmentalism and international cooperation in regulatory industries).
332 See Beth A. Simmons et al., Introduction: The International Diffusion of
Liberalism, 60 INT’L ORG. 781 (2006) (discussing policy diffusion through
international organizations). Indeed, individual countries will tend to emulate
the behavior of their peers within a larger group. Id. at 799 – 801. For example,
upon the ratification of a United Nations convention on discrimination against
women, it was found that “countries emulate others when they are party of a
global political order promoted by non-governmental and inter-governmental
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learning facility, namely an intermediary for the provision of
information and the diffusion of best practice among nudge units
and other government departments around the world that may have
an interest in being informed about and adopting behavioral public
policies. The meta-nudge unit should imitate the Scandinavian
model333 of collaboration of actors involved in behavioral
policymaking at the international level, and have a similar role as
the “What Works Clearinghouses” recently proposed by the U.S.
government,334 namely as “repositories that synthesize evaluation
findings in ways that make research useful to decision makers,
researchers and practitioners.”335
A cautious note should be sounded, though, on the unreflected
adoption of nudging policies by various governments around the
world. This has indeed been cause for concern with policy
diffusion by international organizations like the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the past.336 The ASLM
meta-nudge unit would also have the obligation to advise, and
agencies and groups . . . ”. Beth A. Simmons et al., Introduction: The Diffusion
of Liberalization, in THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF MARKETS & DEMOCRACY 1,
43–44 (2006).
333 The Scandinavian model of behavioral public policymaking is
characterized by its bottom up and decentralized nature. See LUNN, supra note 4,
at 35–6; LUCIE CERNA, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE NATURE
OF POLICY CHANGE AND IMPLEMENTATION: A REVIEW OF DIFFERENT
THEORETICAL APPROACHES 18–19 (2013) (describing the “bottom-up”
approach). There are activities at the municipal level and networks promoting
nudging that are comprised of actors from the public and the private sector. See
LUNN, supra note 4, at 35–6. Denmark, for example, does not currently have a
centralized nudge unit, but many government departments are part of the
“Danish Nudging Network” founded in 2010 which is comprised of researchers,
as well as public and private institutions with the aim of promoting the insights
of behavioral sciences into policy making. Id. at 36–7 (describing various
departments within the Danish Nudging Network); Ly & Soman, supra note 4.
334 OMB Memorandum, supra note 182, at 10–11.
335 Id. at 11 (showing that the same document mentions various examples
of what works clearinghouses like the U.S. Department of Justice’s
CrimeSolutions.gov, and the Department of Education’s What Works
Clearinghouse).
336 EURODAD, WORLD BANK AND IMF CONDITIONALITY: A DEVELOPMENT
INJUSTICE: EURODAD REPORT 3 (2006), http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedfiles/w
hats_new/reports/eurodad_world_bank_and_imf_conditionality_report.pdf.
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debias, governments on the need to use a behavioral solution. As in
other areas of public policy diffusion, the paths followed by first-
movers may be very sticky.337 For this reason, it is important to see
whether the right path has been followed in each case.338 Not every
solution is appropriate for adoption in all cases, and in all
situational and geographical contexts. The lesson of a 10 percent
improvement of tax filling through electronic means by a
government in Western Europe does not automatically mean that
this is a good solution for an African, Asian, or South American
country. It might be better for a country in these parts of the world
to invest the relevant resources differently. This holds all the more
true in the face of varying degrees of biases across cultures and
continents.339 Systemic learning thus means not necessarily just the
diffusion of best practice, but also “debiasing” through information
provision on worst, or mediocre policy: in the realm of
international and comparative law, taking cultural and economic
differences into account is crucial to avoid regulatory error.340 The
ASLM meta-nudge unit can, and should, make a contribution to
such conscious, locally adapted policies.
CONCLUSION
Increasingly, the power of learning is used in psychology and
economics. A number of regulatory agencies on both sides of the
Atlantic and on the international level are following suit,
capitalizing on learning processes to improve regulatory outcomes.
What is lacking, however, is both a coherent normative account of
learning theory in legal scholarship and the systematic application
of such theory to regulatory contexts. This Article aims to fill both
gaps. Based on an extensive review of learning theory in cognitive
and social psychology, game theory, organizational science, and
337 See Alemanno & Sibony, supra note 186, at 14–16 (with reference to
UK BIT).
338 See supra Section II.C.
339 See, e.g., Joseph Henrich et al., ‘Economic Man’ in Cross-Cultural
Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 BEHAV.
&BRAIN SCI. 795 (2005) (analyzing different biases across fifteen different
“small-scale societies”).
340 SeeWORLDBANKGRP., supra note 133, at 153.
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management theory, this Article makes three distinct contributions.
First, it identifies the agents that can benefit from and require
greater learning. Unlike previous scholarship, this Article goes
beyond the individual as a learning subject by bringing institutions,
such as regulatory agencies, into the focus. Interlinking learning by
individuals, institutions, and society at large, we provide an
account of a new dimension of learning: systemic learning.
Second, the Article demonstrates in a number of case studies how
learning strategies are already beginning to be implemented in
different legal contexts. On the one hand, existing patterns of
pretesting, as encouraged by Executive Order 13563 and the UK
BIT’s “Test, Learn, Adapt” strategy, can be found in the revision
of mortgage disclosures by the CFPB, for example.341 On the other
hand, many regulatory interventions still fail to tap the resources of
learning; the elaboration of the EU Consumer Rights Directive
provides a vivid example.342 Against this background, third, the
Article makes several concrete policy suggestions on ways in
which learning can be brought to bear on international and
domestic law in a systematic way. It argues for the use of feedback
loops to stimulate systemic learning; advocates the design and
control of learning strategies by institutionalized systemic learning
facilities within agencies and private companies; and, finally, calls
for the establishment of an Agency for Systemic Learning
Management. As regulatory agencies are pressured to provide
better outcomes in ever shorter timeframes, they increasingly do—
and should—discover the power of learning. In the European
Union, this trend is reflected in the European Commission’s
“Better Regulation” initiative.343 Taking Executive Order 13563 at
face value, the same potentially holds true for the United States.
Finally, behavioral strategies are also increasingly embraced by
international organizations. Thus, there seems to be a present
window of opportunity for the implementation of a coherent
learning approach to regulatory theory and practice in the
European Union, the United States, and at the international level.
341 See supra Section II.D.2.a.
342 See supra Section II.D.2.
343 See EUROPEAN COMM’N, BETTER REGULATION GUIDELINES, supra note
214, at 3.
